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ARTICLE

EVEN SOME INTERNATIONAL LAW IS LOCAL:
IMPLEMENTATION OF TREATIES THROUGH
SUBNATIONAL MECHANISMS
Charlotte Ku, William H. Henning, David P. Stewart, and Paul F.
Diehl*
Multilateral treaties today increasingly touch on subjects where there is existing
domestic law in the United States. In the U.S. federal system, this domestic law may
not be national law, but law of the constituent U.S. States. However, in light of Article
VI of the U.S. Constitution, treaties in their domestic application unavoidably
federalize the subjects they address. The most sensitive issues arise when a treaty focuses
on matters primarily or exclusively dealt with in the United States at the State or local
level. Although U.S. practice allows for some flexibility to accommodate State/local
interests, the federal government reserves the authority to compel compliance in case a
State adopts a rule contrary to an international agreement which would place the United
States in breach of its international obligations. This Article examines the role
constituent States in the U.S. system can play in treaty implementation. The subject is
of interest to determine the conditions under which State authority might be considered
for undertaking and implementing U.S. treaty obligations. This Article examines the
processes under which subnational implementation of international treaties can be
brought to fruition and when it fails; when there are Uniform Law Commission
products and drafting expertise available to facilitate implementation at the State level;
and whether these approaches might enhance the ability of the United States to
implement treaty obligations.
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I. SITUATING THE STUDY
Due to its federal structure, the United States increasingly confronts
an issue not faced by most other countries, particularly those with unitary
structures in which the central government possesses all legislative (or
law-making) power: how to implement its treaty obligations effectively
and in accordance with its government principles of federalism. The issue
may not be readily apparent to those lacking a clear understanding of the
U.S. constitutional structure. It is deeply consequential, however, and in
recent years has generated a new (and somewhat debatable) phenomenon:
implementation of U.S. treaty obligations by subnational (i.e., State and
local) mechanisms.
In the United States, the treaty power is reserved exclusively to the
federal government. Treaties are “made” by the President, by and with
the consent of the Senate.1 The constituent States are in fact expressly
prohibited by the Constitution from entering into “any Treaty, Alliance,
or Confederation” and “without the Consent of Congress . . . into any
Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power.”2 In
its famous Missouri v. Holland decision, the U.S. Supreme Court observed
that the Constitution expressly delegates the entirety of the treaty power
to the federal government, to the exclusion of the States.3
“Treaties”4 are thus creatures of the national government; they
constitute (and are governed by) federal law. Under Article VI, clause 2
of the Constitution, once they have been ratified and brought into force,
they form part of the “supreme law of the land,” equivalent to federal
statutes, binding on the States and pre-empting contrary State law (“the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding”).5
Although it is generally agreed today that the Founders must have
intended treaties to be directly effective, at least with respect to the

1. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
2. Id. cl. 1-3.
3. 252 U.S. 416, 435 (1920).
4. For present purposes, the term “treaty” is used in its domestic (Article II) sense, and not in
the broader context of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which would include
“executive agreements” and other types of written international undertakings between states and
governed by international law.
5. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. One of the main reasons the second clause of Article VI was
included in the Constitution was the failure of the “States” under the Articles of Confederation to
give effect to obligations of the new United States under the 1783 Treaty of Paris, which inter alia
obliged the country to recognize the lawful contracted debts of the Loyalists (the U.S. agreed to
“earnestly recommend” to state legislatures that they recognize the rightful owners of all confiscated
lands and to “provide for the restitution of all estates, rights, and properties, which have been
confiscated belonging to real British subjects”).
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constituent States (their governments, legislatures, and courts),6 the U.S.
Supreme Court added a major complication in a pair of decisions in the
early 19th century by distinguishing between treaties that are “selfexecuting” (meaning directly applicable in all courts, including with regard
to the resolution of private disputes) and those that are not self-executing
(meaning that to be effective and enforceable in domestic law they require
federal implementing legislation).7
Increasingly, treaties have addressed issues on which a substantial
body of domestic law already exists (in the form of constitutional
provisions and doctrine, enacted State and federal legislation, and copious
judicial decisions). Indeed, multilateral treaties today rarely address
subjects where there is no domestic law. In the U.S. federal system, the
relevant domestic law may not be federal (national) but rather law of the
several constituent States.8 Because of a strong political preference,
especially in the U.S. Congress, to resolve any differences between
existing law and the treaty obligations by means of enacted legislation (as
opposed to direct application of the treaty itself), the practice has emerged
of ratifying such treaties on a non-self-executing basis, leaving
implementation to the legislature. In addition, the Senate can condition
its approval with “reservations” to those parts of the treaties that clearly
conflict with constitutional provisions (in particular, the protections of
the Bill of Rights) or existing legislative provisions that are clearly
inconsistent with the relevant treaty obligations. Some reservations
contain the caveat that the reservation could be removed if and when the
conflict had been resolved through subsequent legislation, although this
is not an option for constitutional conflicts.
In an effort to mitigate the concerns raised by federalization, various
approaches to treaty implementation have been adopted. When the treaty
touches on a subject that clearly falls within the federal purview (such as
the regulation of civil aviation, as was the case with the 1929 Warsaw
Convention), implementation by either self-execution or through

6. Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796) (Chase, J.) (“A treaty cannot be the supreme law
of the land, that is of all the United States, if any act of a state legislature can stand in its way.”); cf.
Carlos Vázquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM J. INT’ L L. 695, 698-99 (1995)
(“The history of the Supremacy Clause thus shows that its purpose was to avert violations of treaties
attributable to the United States, and that the Founders sought to accomplish this goal by making
treaties enforceable in the courts at the behest of affected individuals without the need for additional
legislative action, either state or federal.”); John Quigley, Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies of Individuals,
99 COLUM. L. REV. 1082, 1087-1102 (1992) (same).
7. United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 89 (1833); Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.)
253, 314 (1827).
8. David P. Stewart, Recent Trends in U.S. Treaty Implementation, in SUPREME LAW OF THE LAND?:
DEBATING THE CONTEMPORARY EFFECTS OF TREATIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES LEGAL
SYSTEM 234 (Gregory H. Fox, Paul R. Dubinsky & Brad R. Roth eds., 2017).
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legislation does not raise the issue.9 However, in some instances,
multilateral treaties have been adopted on a self-executing basis even
though their implementation would also necessarily implicate, preempt or
impact State law and enforcement to some degree, for example, the
Convention on the International Sale of Goods (“CISG”) and the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations (both of which of course rest on
strong federal authority – regulation of foreign commerce in the one case,
and foreign relations in the other). In these cases, the treaties were
adopted as self-executing as they clearly implicate international interests
properly regulated under the treaty power. Nevertheless, some of these
treaties have worked better in practice than others.
The most sensitive issues arise when the treaty in question focuses on
matters primarily or exclusively dealt with at the State or local level. In a
few such instances, the treaties have been adopted on the basis that they
will be implemented through State law (either legislation or other
governmental action or litigation). U.S. practice has shown some
flexibility in order to accommodate State or local interests (and to rely on
State or local law and procedural mechanisms to give effect to the treaty
requirements) while also implementing important international interests.
In such cases, however, it has been standard practice for the federal
government to include some type of “fallback” mechanism reserving to
the federal executive the necessary authority to compel compliance in the
event a State adopts a contrary rule. Such a provision is necessary to
ensure that the United States does not fail to comply with its international
treaty obligations.10
That fundamental concern explains why the federal government has
not been prepared (to date, at any rate) to rely entirely on enforcement
through State or local implementation.11 On a few occasions, however,
the executive branch has adopted some form of joint implementation,
involving “parallel” measures to give effect to the treaty at both State and
federal levels (with the necessary “fallback” safeguards). These occasions
have involved subjects that normally fall within the purview of the States
rather than the federal government.

9. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation
by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000.
10. The international law rule is that a state may not excuse or justify its failure to carry out its
international treaty obligations on the basis that its internal (domestic) law is inadequate or prevents
it from complying. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 27, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331.
11. The Hague Convention on the International Recovery of Family Maintenance and Other
Forms of Child Support comes close, with the substantive provisions of the Convention set forth
in the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, adopted by every State, and federal involvement
(beyond ratification) limited to legislation conditioning federal support for child support collection
efforts on enactment of the Uniform Act.
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As the international community increasingly addresses (and adopts
instruments concerning) matters that in the United States are typically
regulated by the States rather than the federal government, these issues
become more sensitive for the United States. Must treaties always and
inevitably “federalize” the subjects they deal with? When and how can the
federal government acquiesce in treaty implementation at the State and
local level without unduly risking international liability in the event of
non- compliance? More topically, when can States and local governments
“adopt” international obligations even though the federal government has
not ratified those treaties or otherwise accepted their obligations as
binding? If so, what are the implications for the United States at the
international level?
This Article examines these issues from both the political science and
legal perspectives. The legal academic literature on the topic of
subnational treaty implementation (particularly in the field of human
rights) has grown.12 Yet the evidentiary record on State and local
implementation of treaties is spotty, and there is room for careful
empirical research and documentation describing the extent and contours
of this phenomenon; on this basis, doctrinal conclusions can be drawn
and recommendations made. Separately, a considerable body of literature

12. See, e.g., Thalia González, From Global to Local: Domestic Human Rights Norms in Theory and
Practice, 59 HOW. L.J. 373, 378-80 (2016) (arguing scholarship would greatly benefit from new
studies that embrace on-the-ground specificity in order to better understand how human rights
ideas translate themselves into behavior at subnational and national levels); Risa E. Kaufman, “By
Some Other Means”: Considering the Executive’s Role in Fostering Subnational Human Rights Compliance, 33
CARDOZO L. REV. 1971, 1978-80 (2012) (arguing the federal executive can play a greater role in
fostering compliance with human rights treaties at the state and local level); Johanna Kalb, The
Persistence of Dualism in Human Rights Treaty Implementation, 30 YALE L. & POL ’Y REV. 71, 73-74 (2011)
(identifying strategies for promoting broader subnational participation in implementing the ratified
human rights instruments and for engaging states and cities with the United States' international
obligations); Gaylynn Burroughs, More Than An Incidental Effect on Foreign Affairs: Implementation of
Human Rights by State and Local Governments, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 411, 415 (2006)
(arguing constitutional jurisprudence should develop to allow state and local governments to enact
both inward- and outward-looking human rights legislation); Lesley Wexler, Take The Long Way
Home: Sub-Federal Integration of Unratified and Non-Self-Executing Treaty Law, 28 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1, 5
(2006) (examining how sub-federal actors may undertake a treaty integrating role even as the federal
government ignores or abandons the particular treaty); Catherine Powell, Dialogic Federalism:
Constitutional Possibilities for Incorporation of Human Rights Law in the United States, 150 U. PA. L. REV.
245, 249-51 (2001) (proposing an intergovernmental approach to the allocation of authority
between federal and sub-federal systems in the implementation of international human rights law).
But see Margaret E. McGuinness, Treaties, Federalism, and the Contested Legacy of Missouri v. Holland, in
SUPREME LAW OF THE LAND? DEBATING THE CONTEMPORARY EFFECTS OF TREATIES WITHIN
THE UNITED STATES LEGAL SYSTEM 179 (Gregory H. Fox, Paul R. Dubinsky & Brad R. Roth
eds., 2017) (examining the effect of federalism on the making and enforcement of treaties in the
United States); Noha Shawki, Book Review, 72 J. POL. 1259 (2010) (discussing a political-science
orientation).
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exists on subnational activity in international law, examining issues of legal
pluralism, regulatory coordination, and horizontal federalism.13
The study of how domestic legal institutions and processes interact
with international law and specifically treaty law has produced a rich
interdisciplinary literature that draws on social science research methods.
Studies to understand how human rights treaties work in various political
and legal systems paved the way.14 These studies added domestic
institutional and political dimensions to the earlier and more traditional
focus on how international law is treated in national constitutions.15
Studying how domestic politics, processes, and institutions receive
and implement international law has also brought us closer to those who
are responsible for discharging these obligations. The increased need to
create and to adopt international treaties governing areas that were
primarily domestic grows out of recognition that a common approach is
desirable to handle the volume of matters and number of approaches in
specific private and commercial transactions around the world.16
The focus of this Article is on the role that constituent States in the
U.S. system play in treaty implementation through their legislative
authority and otherwise. The subject is of interest to determine the
conditions under which State interests and authority might most
appropriately be taken into consideration for implementing U.S. treaty
obligations. When international law tracks existing State law and practice,
domestic U.S. implementation can be facilitated. We examine the
advantages of relying on existing law or existing State administrative
structures (e.g., courts) to implement international treaty obligations.
13. See, e.g., Hari M. Osofsky, Rethinking the Geography of Local Climate Action: Multi-Level Network
Participation in Metropolitan Regions, 2015 UTAH L. REV. 173, 176-77 (considering how the multilevel
climate network participation could be more effective in encouraging additional local action); Hari
M. Osofsky, Diagonal Federalism and Climate Change Implications for the Obama Administration, 62 ALA.
L. REV. 237, 241-43 (2011) (proposing greater attention be given to the “diagonal” quality of an
administration’s regulatory interactions); Robert B. Ahdieh, When Subnational Meets International: The
Politics and Place of City, State, and Province in the World, 102 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 339, 340 (2008);
Judith Resnik, The Internationalism of American Federalism: Missouri and Holland, 73 MO. L. REV. 1105,
1133-34 (2008) (examining horizontal federalism); Robert B. Ahdieh, From Federalism to Intersystemic
Governance: The Changing Nature of Modern Jurisdiction, 57 EMORY L.J. 1, 4-5 (2007) (attempting to
systematize the exploration of cross-jurisdictional engagement).
14. See, e.g., BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
DOMESTIC POLITICS (Cambridge University Press, 2012) (exploring why domestic entities commit
to and comply with international human rights treaties); Emilia Justyna Powell & Jeffrey K. Staton,
Domestic Judicial Institutions and Human Rights Treaty Violations, 53 INT’L STUD. Q. 149 (2009) (arguing
that the effectiveness of the domestic judiciary influences the way states implement treaties).
15. See generally Tom Ginsburg, Svitlana Chernykh, & Zachary Elkins,
Commitment and Diffusion: How and Why National Constitutions Incorporate International Law, 2008
U. ILL. L. REV. 201 (2008) (describing international law on the constitutional level).
16. Conventions, Protocols, and Principles, HAGUE CONF. PRIV. INT’L L.,
https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions (last visited Dec. 25, 2019) (listing treaties
since 1951).
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Using existing legal and political infrastructures to carry out
international obligations is likely to be less costly and disruptive than
creating new and separate governing systems to support specific
international legal obligations.17 The purpose of this Article is to
understand when State legislation and other collective State action might
most appropriately play a role in discharging this function. It examines
the processes under which subnational implementation of international
treaties occurs with the goal of identifying the conditions under which
such an approach can be successful. Accordingly, we examine situations
that have achieved success as well as ones that proved incomplete or
failed.
We begin, however, with a discussion of the broad framework under
which subnational implementation of international law occurs. This
discussion involves a brief look at so-called normative and operating
systems in international law, with the former representing the prescriptive
elements that regulate behavior and the latter addressing the institutions
and process of implementation. A gap is created when the operating
system, through its international or domestic institutions and processes,
is unable to implement or give effect to an international obligation (a part
of the normative system).18 We consider if subnational implementation in
the United States is a way to narrow this gap for the United States thereby
enabling more international obligations to be carried out and to have their
intended impact. We then move to a description of subnational
implementation in the United States and a brief elucidation of similar
situations in other countries, indicating the U.S. context is not sui generis.
We end with some conclusions on how best to engage States in the treaty
process to provide the level of State participation that would allow for
greater U.S. participation in multilateral treaties without federalizing the
subject area.

II.

WHY SUBNATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION OF
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS?

Some areas of international agreement and commitment obviously
concern critical aspects of international relations that, in the U.S. system,
fall exclusively within national competence. Examples include matters
relating to national security such as arms control and the waging of war,
17. In either case, the solution would need to comply with the provisions of Article VI, cl. 2
of the U.S. Constitution and ensure that the federal government could carry out its constitutional
(and international) responsibilities for treaty-making, implementation, and compliance. See U.S.
CONST. ART. VI, CL. 2.
18. See generally PAUL F. DIEHL & CHARLOTTE KU, THE DYNAMICS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW (2010).
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international trade, and diplomatic relations including the recognition of
foreign states and governments. Increasingly, however, international legal
obligations are likely to require performance or implicate the existing law
at the subnational or local level — for instance, issues related to
enforcement of child custody and support orders issued by foreign
governments, foreign requests for information relevant to proceedings in
foreign courts, and the like.
One critical measurement is the degree to which the international
obligation is or is not implemented effectively. It cannot be assumed, for
example, that direct implementation (i.e., through self-execution as federal
law) is necessarily “better” or more effective than indirect implementation
through federal legislation or by State law.
Consider, for example, the complaints brought against the United
States for its failure to comply effectively with its obligations under the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.19 Article 36 of the Convention
states that
[T]he competent authorities of the receiving State shall,
without delay, inform the consular post of the sending State
if, within its consular district, a national of that State is
arrested or committed to prison or to custody pending trial
or is detained in any other manner. Any communication
addressed to the consular post by the person arrested, in
prison, custody or detention shall be forwarded by the said
authorities without delay . . . .20
When ratified in 1969, the treaty was deemed self-executing and thus
became directly applicable throughout the United States. In several
notorious instances, however, foreign nationals were arrested by local
authorities but not advised of their rights under the Vienna Convention,
and in consequence the United States was held in breach of its
international obligations.
Since 1997, six capital punishment cases involving the failure to
comply with Article 36 were appealed to federal courts after the
defendants had exhausted their remedies at the State level, and noncompliance was one among several issues in twenty-one other cases.21
Three cases resulted in the United States being brought before the
International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) for its failure to carry out its treaty
obligations as stated in Article 36. In 1998, Paraguay instituted
proceedings against the United States contending that the
19. See, e.g., Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008); Republic of Paraguay v. Allen, 134 F.3d
622, 625-26 (4th Cir. 1998).
20. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations art. 36(1)(b), Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77.
21. Isaac Olson, Vienna Convention Death Appeals Cases: 1997 to Present (Sept. 15, 2018)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
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Commonwealth of Virginia had detained, tried and convicted a
Paraguayan national, Angel Francisco Breard, of murder and attempted
rape and sentenced him to death, all without advising him of his right to
consular assistance or notifying Paraguayan consular officials.22 Paraguay
sought interim measures to prevent the execution of its national.
Nevertheless, Breard was executed by the Commonwealth of Virginia on
April 15, 1998.
In the case of José Medellín, a Mexican national who confessed to the
1993 gang rape and murder of two teenage girls in Houston, Texas, local
authorities failed to inform the Mexican consulate of his arrest or apprise
Mr. Medellín of his rights to have consular assistance while he was in
custody. In 2003, Mexico brought suit against the United States in the
International Court of Justice claiming the United States to be in violation
of its obligations under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. In
2004, the ICJ found the United States in violation of its treaty obligations
vis-à-vis Mexico. The ICJ determined that the “appropriate reparation in
this case consists in the obligation of the United States of America to
provide, by means of its own choosing, review and reconsideration of the
convictions and sentences of the Mexican nationals.”23 In his final appeal
to the U.S. Supreme Court, Mr. Medellín sought to enforce the ICJ
judgment, arguing that the United States was legally bound to comply with
it.24
The U.S. Supreme Court, however, determined that judgments of the
International Court of Justice are not directly applicable as domestic law
in the United States.25 Neither the Optional Protocol to the Vienna
Convention (which permitted the Court to hear the case) nor the U.N.
Charter Article 94 (which obligated the United States to comply with the
ICJ’s judgment) are directly applicable (“self-executing”) as a matter of
U.S. law. Even more importantly, the U.S. Supreme Court said that the
President alone could not make them “self-executing.” 26 In this instance,
although there is a clear treaty obligation, the practical effect of making
the treaty ‘non-self-executing’ is to render it unenforceable in federal
court. Consequently, foreigners denied the benefits of a treaty by State
authorities would have no remedy.
Moreover, attempts to “federalize” ordinary policing by national
legislation have been met with reluctance by federal authorities and strong
opposition by States. Proposed federal legislation was therefore never

22. Allen, 134 F.3d at 622.
23. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), Judgment, 2004 I.C.J. 12,72 (Mar. 31).
24. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 504.
25. Id. at 508-09.
26. Id. at 530.
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adopted.27 Clearly, this gap in the domestic effectiveness of the
international legal obligations of the United States could be filled by
subnational implementation in the form of individual States passing
legislation guaranteeing the rights accorded by the treaty. Individual States
— California, Illinois, and Oregon — have enacted some form of State
or local law to implement Article 36, but most have not.28
In many cases, subnational implementation of treaties is not necessary
because of the correspondence of existing domestic law with the relevant
treaty obligations. For example, in the case of the 1984 U.N. Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, the Reagan administration determined that “implementing
legislation was not necessary since existing federal and state law already
provided grounds for prosecuting anyone accused of committing an act
within the scope of the term ‘torture’ as defined by the Convention.”29
Since new, sweeping federal legislation was not needed, the goals of the
treaty were given effect largely by State law — though the federal criminal
code was amended to permit, in some situations, prosecution of acts of
torture committed outside the United States.30
The contours of the distinction between self-executing and non-selfexecuting treaties were unclear from the outset, and they continue to
trouble courts and scholars alike. In a recent formulation, the U.S.
Supreme Court pronounced that “[a] non-self-executing treaty, by
definition, is one that was ratified with the understanding that it is not to
have domestic effect of its own force” and thus can only be enforced
pursuant to duly-enacted legislation.31
Under this approach, unless so implemented, such a treaty does not
create binding or enforceable federal law. Nonetheless, a constituent State
may not constitutionally adopt legislation (or take other action) that would
be contrary to an accepted treaty obligation of the United States, whether
self-executing or not.

27. See Consular Notification Compliance Act of 2011, S. 1194, 112th Cong. (2011).
28. See generally David P. Stewart, The Emergent Human Right to Consular Notification, Access and
Assistance, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF NEW HUMAN RIGHTS: RECOGNITION, NOVELTY,
RHETORIC (Andreas von Arnauld et al. eds., forthcoming 2020).
29. Id. at 248-49.
30. 18 U.S.C. § 2340A, added by Pub. L. No. 103-236, tit. V, § 506(a), 108 Stat. 463 (1994);
amended by Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit. VI, § 60020, 108 Stat. 1979 (1994); Pub. L. No. 107-56, tit.
VIII, § 811(g), 115 Stat. 381 (2001).
31. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 527; see also id. at 505 n.2 (“The label ‘self-executing’ has on occasion
been used to convey different meanings. What we mean by ‘self-executing’ is that the treaty has
automatic domestic effect as federal law upon ratification. Conversely, a ‘non-self-executing’ treaty
does not by itself give rise to domestically enforceable federal law. Whether such a treaty has
domestic effect depends upon implementing legislation passed by Congress.”); Missouri v.
Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920) (finding some treaties require implementing legislation).
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For many years the issue of non-self-execution was a relatively
technical one, largely left to the courts to decide on a case-by-case basis
as the issue was presented in the specific context of litigation.32 With the
post-World War II proliferation of multilateral treaties, however, and in
particular the adoption of increasingly detailed human rights treaties,
attention focused on the effect a ratified treaty would have on the related
questions of (i) individual rights (i.e., when and in what circumstances
could individuals rely on treaties to challenge the laws and actions of the
States as well as the federal government for alleged violations of human
rights), and (ii) federalism (i.e., to what extent could a treaty authorize the
federal government to regulate subjects or spheres of activity traditionally
within the purview of the States — such as family law).33
The underlying structural concerns (i.e., about questions of
federalism, intrusion into State and local matters, and changing State and
local law through the treaty power) have in some well-known instances
actually prevented U.S. adherence to multilateral conventions. In
particular, these issues have resulted in the Senate’s refusal to give advice
and consent to a number of human rights treaties, including the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.
Most tellingly, the executive branch has not even transmitted to the Senate
the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which the United States signed
in 1995 but today is the only country in the world not to have ratified,
largely (but not exclusively) because of federalism issues.34
In part as a consequence of the resulting frustration on the part of
human rights advocates, a number of initiatives have been undertaken in
the United States to adopt the substance of some human rights treaties at
the State, city and local levels.35 Even though States, cities and local
32. See Holland, 252 U.S. 416; Medellin, 552 U.S. 491; Republic of Marshall Islands v. United
States, 865 F.3d 118 (9th Cir. 2017).
33. The latter question had, of course, been a source of controversy ever since the Supreme
Court’s decision in Holland, id. In the period immediately following World War II and the creation
of the UN, it had become especially contested in respect of federal efforts to force the segregationist
states to change their laws. The conservative reaction took the form of the so-called “Bricker
Amendment,” which (in general terms) would have prevented use of the treaty power to change
domestic law (inter alia by forbidding “self- executing” treaties). See generally DAVID SLOSS, THE
DEATH OF TREATY SUPREMACY: AN INVISIBLE CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE (2016); MARTIN
FLAHERTY, RESTORING THE GLOBAL JUDICIARY: WHY THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD RULE IN
U.S. FOREIGN A FFAIRS (2019).
34. David P. Stewart, Ratification of Convention on the Rights of the Child, 5 GEO. J. FIGHTING
POVERTY 161, 176 (1998).
35. David Kaye, State Execution of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 3 U.C.
IRVINE L. REV. 95, 97-98 (2013); CLOSING THE GAP: THE FEDERAL R OLE IN RESPECTING &
ENSURING HUMAN RIGHTS AT THE STATE & LOCAL LEVEL, COLUM. L. SCH. HUM. RTS. INST.
(2013) (discussing ways states, cities, and local governments can work to give effect to the purposes
and principles of ICCPR).
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governments cannot directly “join” or become a “party” to any
international treaty (whether or not ratified by the United States), they are
not prohibited from adopting measures to give effect to some of the
substantive requirements and protections of a treaty, as long as their
implementation does not conflict with federal law. The extent to which
an action might be considered “pre-empted” because of conflict with
federal foreign relations authority or policy, presumably including
obligations of international law, is a debated and unclear issue.36 On a
more practical level, as Judith Resnik observes, “to look only at the
national level is to miss a lot of the action.”37
By way of example, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, adopted the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (of course, not as a treaty or even
a law, but as a standard for behavior) in 2009. In one fashion or another,
Hawaii, Rhode Island and South Carolina, along with Austin, Chicago,
New York, and Savannah are said to have endorsed the Convention on
the Rights of the Child (at least its principles).38 In 1998, San Francisco
famously adopted the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (“CEDAW”) as a local ordinance. Other
U.S. cities have joined “Cities for CEDAW,” which describes itself as a
movement of city and local activists across the United States “aiming to
incorporate the gender- equity principles and obligations of CEDAW into
city governance and local city policies. Seven cities39 have passed
CEDAW ordinances. Twenty other cities have passed CEDAW
resolutions affirming support for CEDAW principles. More than 30 other
cities including Boston, Denver, New York, Philadelphia, Phoenix,
Portland, Tacoma, and Washington, D.C. are considering either a

36. In Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 440-41 (1968), the U.S. Supreme Court struck down
an Oregon statute barring citizens of communist countries from inheriting property of in-state
decedents, on the ground that – even in the absence of an applicable federal law or treaty – it
constituted “an intrusion in the federal domain” with “a direct impact upon foreign relations [that] .
. . may well adversely affect the power of the central government to deal with those problems.” Id.
at 441. The decision is often described as establishing a doctrine of “dormant foreign affairs preemption”; cf. Ingrid Wuerth, The Future of the Federal Common Law of Foreign Relations, 106 GEO. L.J.
1825 (2018). But see Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 533 U.S. 396, 421 (2003) (distinguishing between
“field” and “conflict” pre-emption and noting that “[t]he exercise of the federal executive authority
means that State law must give way where, as here, there is evidence of clear conflict between the
policies adopted by the two”).
37. Judith Resnik, The Internationalism of American Federalism: Missouri and Holland, 73 MO. L.
REV. 1105, 1110 (2008).
38. See BLUHM LEGAL CLINIC, N.W. U. S CH. OF L., TOOLKIT FOR THE A DOPTION OF THE
CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD BY CITY COUNCILS AND STATE LEGISLATURES 8
(2009).
39. The cities are San Francisco, California; Berkeley, California; Cincinnati, Ohio; Honolulu,
Hawaii; Los Angeles, California; Miami-Dade County, Florida; and Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
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CEDAW ordinance or resolution.40 More recently, the Trump
Administration’s renunciation of the Paris Climate Agreement has
apparently reinvigorated an effort at the subnational level to adopt
measures giving effect to international undertakings on climate change.41

III.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: UNDERSTANDING
SUBNATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION

Subnational implementation of international agreements results from
one of the gaps between what we refer to as the normative and operating
systems in international law.42 What we see as a gap that impedes
implementation of an international obligation may prove to be an
important checkpoint to ensure adequate capacity to carry out the
international obligation including the alignment of political interests.
Described in more detail below, the normative system is directive in that
it specifies the prescriptions and prohibitions for behavior among actors
in the international system. The operating system is structural in that it
provides the institutions and processes to regulate how law is created,
implemented, and enforced.
A. The Normative System
“Normative” is used to describe the directive aspects of international
law because this area of law creates norms out of particular values or
policies. These norms are quasi-legislative in character because they direct
specific changes in state and other actors’ behaviors, such as limitations
on child labor.43 In defining the normative system, the participants in the
40. See generally CITIES FOR CEDAW: A CAMPAIGN TO MAKE THE GLOBAL LOCAL (June
Zeitlin et al. eds., 2017); David P. Stewart, Incorporating International Human Rights Law: Well Known
Limitations and New Initiatives Taken at State, City and Local Levels, 38 HUM. R TS. L.J. 1(2018).
41. U.S. State Climate Action Plans, CTR. FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY SOLUTIONS (Apr. 2019),
https://www.c2es.org/document/climate-action-plans (suggesting many States have, or are
developing, climate action plans); see also Audrey Comstock, U.S. Cities and States Want to Implement
the Paris Climate Accord Goals. It’s Not That Simple, WASH. POST, (June 13, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/06/13/u-s-cities-and-stateswant-to-implement-the-paris-climate-accord-goals-its-not-that-simple/ (identifying the challenges
States face in attempting to implement the Paris Climate Agreement on a subnational level); S.F.,
CAL. ENVTL. CODE ch. 1, § 100(E) (2008) (adopting the Precautionary Principle).
42. DIEHL & KU, supra note 18, at 2.
43. Our conception of a normative system is similar to what Hart defines as primary rules that
impose duties on actors to perform or abstain from actions, but there is an important difference. See
H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 151 (1961). Hart sees primary rules as the basic building
blocks of a legal system, logically and naturally coming before the development of what we define as
the operating system components. Id. at 91–92. For Hart, a primitive legal system can be one with
developed rules, but without substantial structures to interpret or enforce those rules. Id. at 89. Our
view of the normative system does not necessarily assign primacy to such rules vis-à-vis the operating
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international legal process engage in a political and legislative exercise that
defines the substance and scope of the law. Nevertheless, the
establishment of international legal norms still is less precise and
structured than in domestic legal systems where formal deliberative
bodies enact legislation.
In contrast to the general terms associated with topics of the
operating system (see below, e.g., jurisdiction, actors or dispute
resolution), the normative system is issue-specific, with many
components within issue areas (e.g., status of women within the broader
topic area of human rights). Many normative issues have long been on the
agenda of international law, such as proscriptions on the use of military
force or various rules concerning the law of the sea (e.g., seizure of
commercial vessels during wartime). Others such as human rights and the
environment have developed almost exclusively in the past seventy years.
B. The Operating System
The effectiveness of the normative system depends in large part on
the operating system, the mechanisms and processes that are designed to
ensure orderly processes and compliance with those norms, and change
if problems signal a need for change.44 The operating system of
international law sets out the consensus of its constituent actors (primarily
states) on distribution of authority and responsibilities for governance
within the system. Who, for example, are the authorized decision-makers
in international law? Whose actions can bind not only the parties involved,
but also others? How do we know that an authoritative decision has taken
place? When does the resolution of a conflict or a dispute give rise to new
law? These are the questions that the operating system answers. Note that
the operating system may be associated with formal structures, but not all
operating system elements are institutional. For example, the Vienna
Convention on Treaties45 establishes no institutional mechanisms but
does specify various operational rules about treaties and therefore the
parameters of law making.
C. Gaps in the Operating System
The development of a new legal norm (or the extensive modification
of an existing one) may produce changes in the international operating
system. The normative system may be somewhat autonomous from the operating system and may
even lag behind in its development.
44. DIEHL & KU, supra note 18, at 28-30; HART, supra note 43, at 209.
45. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
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system. Yet the latter is far from guaranteed. First, the extant operating
system may be able to accommodate the new norm with no changes
required. For example, a new global trade agreement may comport well
with existing World Trade Organization mechanisms, including its forum
for dispute resolution. In this way, new norms do not upset the
equilibrium between normative and operating systems.
In a second scenario, a new norm may arise that necessitates a change
in the operating system in order to give the former full effect, but such a
change does not occur because the operating system is incompatible,
ineffective, or insufficient to give the new norm effect. For example,
holding national leaders responsible for torture or other crimes
(Convention on Torture) created new norms, but is incompatible with
notions of sovereign immunity. The 1999 Spanish case against Chile’s
General Pinochet demonstrates this tension.46
Operating system change, although needed, may not occur, and as a
result an imbalance is created between the operating and normative
systems. Thus, certain norms will not have effect in the system; that is,
they will not be implemented, observed, or enforced in an efficient
manner. What is likely to happen as a result of this imbalance? The most
obvious answer is nothing: the system remains out of equilibrium and new
international legal norms have limited or no effect on behavior. Yet other
possibilities exist. There are other processes by which the operatingnormative system imbalance can be redressed — all outside the formal
international legal system. Subnational implementation is one of those
processes. Let us briefly note some of the other possibilities.47
First, non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”) can play a role as
supplements to or substitutes for the international law operating system.
The technical character of many issues now facing policymakers
continues to make them, as they have been for decades, receptive to
expert information. Thus, some NGOs are well positioned to assume
roles in the implementation of norms, particularly in those areas in which
specialized expertise is required.
Second, “soft law” mechanisms might be used for ensuring norm
compliance.48 Despite some ambiguity, soft law mechanisms are broadly
those that do not involve a formal legal obligation or legal processes, but
nevertheless represent a shared understanding or consensus about
procedure or behavior among the parties. In the context of the operating
system, informal or soft mechanisms for resolving jurisdictional
46. R. v. Bow St. Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3)
[1999] UKHL 17 [2000] 1 AC (HL) 147 (appeal taken from Eng.).
47. See DIEHL & KU, supra note 22, at 108-25.
48. Gregory C. Schaffer & Mark A. Pollack, Hard vs. Soft Law: Alternatives, Complements, &
Antagonists in International Governance, 94 MINN. L. REV. 706, 712–15, 719–21 (2010).
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disagreements (e.g., how to resolve disputes when overlapping
jurisdiction is present) or disputes over substance (e.g., what diplomatic
solutions are legitimized) represent soft law adaptations to inadequacies
in “hard law” provisions. A growing body of empirical work shows that
such informal mechanisms influence behavior.49
A third gap filling process is legal internalization. This occurs when
an international norm is embedded in the national legal systems and
domestic legal mechanisms pick up the slack left by inadequacies in
international legal mechanisms. One form is legislative internalization,
when domestic lobbying embeds international law norms into binding
national legislation or even constitutional law that officials of a
government must then obey as part of the domestic legal fabric. Local
actors then attain standing to press claims and seek redress in domestic
courts. The European Union represents a special case and one in which
internalization has gradually become more routinized.50 When national
adoption of legislation does not occur or is not appropriate in a federal
system, adoption might occur by governmental units at the subnational
level.
Subnational implementation represents a special kind of approach to
filling the gap left when the national legal operating system cannot give
full effect to treaty obligations. In federal systems with independent
component government entities (e.g., the United States or Canada)
encompassing multiple layers of government, it might be impossible for
international law to have immediate legal impact within a subnational unit
without additional national or subnational action, that is without
implementing legislation. In the U.S. system, this could be national
legislation that results in federalizing areas that may otherwise be within
State and local jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the power to federalize is
limited. As noted in Bond v. United States:

49. See, e.g., Andrew T. Guzman & Timothy L. Meyer, International Soft Law, 2 J. LEGAL
ANALYSIS 171, 202 (2010) (“There is a broad consensus in the international law literature that the
nonbinding rulings of international tribunals do, indeed, influence legal rules.”); Gregory Schaffer
& Tom Ginsburg, The Empirical Turn in International Legal Scholarship, 106 A M. J. INT’L L. 1, 39 (2012)
(discussing the role of nonstate actors and “soft law” in the production of international
environmental law); Chris Brummer, How International Financial Law Works (and How it Doesn’t), 99
GEO. L.J. 257, 263 (2011) (“[E]ven where rules are not legally binding, they may still influence the
behavior of regulators and market participants seeking to make credible commitments of efficiency,
value, and strong corporate governance to investors.”); Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Soft Law:
Lessons from Congressional Practice, 61 STAN. L. REV. 573 (2008) (discussing how soft law influences
the behavior of other lawmaking bodies and of the public); Thomas A. Mensah, Soft Law: A Fresh
Look at an Old Mechanism, 38 ENVTL. POL’Y & L. 50, 51 (2008) (discussing how particular soft law
principles and rules may be used to regulate or influence the operation of states and other actors in
ways that contribute to the protection of the environment and sustainable development).
50. Anne-Marie Burley & Walter Mattli, Europe Before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal
Integration, 47 INT’L ORG. 41, 42 (1993).
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It has long been settled, for example, that we presume
federal statutes do not abrogate state sovereign immunity .
. . . Closely related to these is the well- established principle
that “it is incumbent upon the federal courts to be certain
of Congress’ intent before finding that federal law
overrides” the “usual constitutional balance of federal and
state powers.”51
As the level of government charged with carrying out the foreign
relations of the United States, however, the federal government can in
many cases preempt State and local law where inconsistent with U.S.
international obligations.52
Indeed, some international legal obligations by their very character
require changes in internal or national law. In federal systems, national
legislation to implement treaty obligations might prove difficult given
constitutional provisions and other devolution to lower level government
entities. Soft law and the employment of NGOs are also not options in
these situations to deal with the normative-operating gap. In these
instances, the adoption of laws at the State or provincial level might be
the way to ensure that treaty obligations at the national level are met and
international norms influence behaviors in the manner intended
domestically. We examine that process and its effectiveness in the United
States in the following sections.

IV. THE UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION AND SUBNATIONAL
IMPLEMENTATION IN THE UNITED STATES

51. Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 856–57 (2014).
52. For a contemporary example of a preemption conflict, see United States v. California, 921
F.3d. 865, 881-82 (9th Cir. 2019), an action initiated by the United States in response to the sanctuary
movement claiming that three California laws were preempted due to conflicts with federal law. One
limited the discretion of state and local officials to cooperate with federal immigration authorities
(S.B. 54). Another required the state attorney general to inspect facilities where immigrants were being
detained by federal agents while awaiting court dates or deportation (A.B. 103). A third prohibited
public and private employers from cooperating with federal enforcement (unless such cooperation is
mandated by a court order or a specific federal law), and required employers to notify employees of
federal scrutiny (A.B. 450). The district court denied in most regards the United States’ motion for a
preliminary injunction. The court of appeals held that the district court had not abused its discretion
in concluding that A.B. 450, including its employee-notice provisions, was not preempted; that S.B.
54’s limitations on cooperation were consistent with the Tenth Amendment and the anticommandeering doctrine; but that one component of A.B. 103 discriminated against and burdened
the federal government in violation of the intergovernmental immunity doctrine. As had the district
court, the court of appeals distinguished Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012), insofar as the
State law regulated State law enforcement activities, and employer-employee relationships, rather than
varying the techniques for regulating employers that Congress had already extensively (and
exclusively) regulated. Id.

2019]

INTERNATIONAL LAW IS LOCAL

119

Although subnational implementation might be required to give
treaties their intended effect, there is no guarantee it will occur. There are
a number of entities that provide the U.S. Department of State with useful
advice on the issue of subnational treaty implementation.53 We focus on
one of these — the Uniform Law Commission (“ULC”)54 — and examine
whether engaging the ULC and translating treaty obligations into uniform
State legislation would improve the likelihood of States complying with
international treaty obligations in the United States. Even if the
mechanism of uniform State legislation is not required for a treaty to have
its intended effect, the ULC plays a role in shaping implementation at the
national level so the treaty is more congruent with existing State law.
Since its creation in 1892 the ULC has been a central player in the
codification of State law in the United States.55 According to an FAQ
posted on its official website, “the ULC is the nation’s oldest State
governmental association. A nonpartisan, volunteer organization, the
ULC is the source of more than 300 draft and proposed statutes that
secure uniformity of state law when differing laws would undermine the
interests of citizens throughout the United States.”56 There are
commissioners from every State, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico,
and the U.S. Virgin Islands. A commissioner must be an attorney
appointed by a governmental authority, most commonly the governor,
and must serve as a volunteer who receives no salary or other form of
compensation.57 The primary areas in which the organization has
produced uniform acts are commercial law, family and domestic relations
law, probate and trust law, real estate law, and the law governing alternate
forms of dispute resolution, but there are uniform acts on a wide range of
other topics.
Approval for the drafting of a uniform act must be based on a
determination that uniformity among the States is desirable and
practicable, and the purpose of a uniform act is to simplify “individuals’
lives and facilitate business transactions by providing consistent rules and
procedures from State to State. Every day, when a person conducts
business, enters a contract, makes a purchase or sale, obtains or transfers
53. See, e.g., Office of the Legal Adviser, General Resources – Private International Law, U.S. STATE
DEP’T, https://www.state.gov/general-resources-private-international-law/(last visited Jan. 1,
2020) (listing as resources the American Branch of the International Law Association, the American
Law Institute, the Section on International Law of the American Bar Association, the American
Society of International Law and the Uniform Law Commission).
54. The formal name of the Uniform Law Commission is the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. See UNIF. LAW. COMM’ N CONST. art. 1, § 1.1, 2009–2010
REF. BOOK 113 (2009).
55. FAQs, UNIF. LAW COMM’ N, https://www.uniformlaws.org/aboutulc/faq (last visited Jan.
1, 2020).
56. Id.
57. Id.
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property, or takes care of a family matter, it is likely that a ULC law
applies.”58
The ULC does not have lawmaking authority; rather, it drafts acts for
the various jurisdictions to consider and enact. Because each jurisdiction’s
legislature has the ultimate enacting authority, even a uniform act may
contain non-uniform provisions that reflect local interests. Although the
ideal, sometimes achieved, is to make the laws among the jurisdictions
uniform, as a practical matter the effect is most commonly to harmonize
those laws.
ULC commissioners draft “specific acts; they discuss, consider, and
amend drafts of other commissioners; they decide whether to recommend
an act as a uniform or a model act; and they work toward enactment of
ULC acts in their home jurisdictions.”59 These activities apply to broad
sets of concerns, primarily domestic ones. The question for this paper is
what role the ULC might play in the implementation of international law,
particularly in subjects that have been principally domestic in character
and within the domain of the States in the U.S. federal system. The issue
is most pertinent in subjects in which the organization has drafted and
gained implementation of a uniform act. Given the ULC’s track record in
harmonizing the laws of the more than fifty jurisdictions that comprise
the U.S. federal system and given that implementation of a treaty at the
federal level has a preemptive effect under the Supremacy Clause of the
Constitution,60 it was inevitable that the ULC would play a role in
implementing international treaty obligations.
The ULC has long recognized the preemptive power of international
law implemented at the federal level. In his address at the 1956 annual
meeting ULC President Barton H. Kuhns stated:
The problem of preserving through uniformity our state
and local governments on the one hand, while seeking
uniformity at an international level on the other, presents a
sort of obstacle course into which one may tread only with
extreme caution. The somewhat obvious method of
unifying international law by treaty or convention might, at
the same time, destroy the very sovereignty of the states
which uniformity of state law is designed to protect. And
yet, as the far corners of the world are gathered closer and
closer together we will soon be reaching a point where the
58. Id.
59. Overview, UNIF. LAW COMM’N, https://www.uniformlaws.org/aboutulc/overview (last
visited Nov. 24, 2019).
60. William H. Henning, The Uniform Law Commission and Cooperative Federalism: Implementing
Private International Law Conventions through Uniform State Laws, 2 ELON L. REV. 39, 44 (2011).
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desirability of uniformity of the laws of different nations
will become more and more apparent.61
One way to ameliorate the preemptive effect of federal law is to
implement a treaty in part by drafting and enacting, in coordination with
federal authorities, uniform State legislation. An early effort to do this
occurred in the 1970s when the United States signed the Convention
Providing the Uniform Act on the Form of a Will completed under the
auspices of UNIDROIT.62 The Uniform Wills Recognition Act was
developed by the ULC in coordination with the Department of State’s
Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for Private International Law
(“L/PIL”) and was enacted in sixteen States, but the enactment process
stalled for a complex set of reasons and the treaty has never been ratified
Attempts to revive the project in the early 2000s were unsuccessful.63
More recently, ULC Commissioner and Delaware Judge Battle
Robinson noted: “While the ULC’s primary emphasis has been on
unifying state law, in recent years, with the rapid increase of
‘globalization,’ the ULC has become more cognizant about the impact of
international proposals on traditional areas of state law.”64
Commissioner Robinson described an important component of the
ULC’s efforts to keep abreast of international developments that might
implicate State law as follows:
In 2003, in response to [increased globalization], the ULC
created the Committee on International Legal
Developments. The functions of this committee include
monitoring activities of organizations in the international
law field that may impact state law, making
recommendations about establishing drafting committees
to work on projects that involve international issues, and
following the progress of ULC projects that are
international in scope.65

61. NAT’L CONF. COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, HANDBOOK 42, 50 (1956).
62. The International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (“UNIDROIT”) is an
independent intergovernmental organization whose mission is to harmonize and to coordinate
private and commercial law between states and among groups of states. For information about
UNIDROIT, see History & Overview, UNIDROIT, https://www.unidroit.org/aboutunidroit/overview (last visited Jan. 1, 2020).
63. The enacting States delayed effectiveness until the treaty was ratified and thus the act has
never gone into effect anywhere.
64. B.R. Robinson, Integrating an International Convention into State Law: The UIFSA Experience, 43
FAM. L.Q. 61, 64 (2009).
65. Id.
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At about the same time the ULC adopted a formal policy regarding
its approach to international matters. The 2006 Statement of Policy on
International Activities explains:
With the movement toward globalization, the federal
government increasingly participates in the promulgation of
private international law conventions that, upon
ratification, become preemptive federal law. This disrupts
the law in areas such as commercial and family law that
historically have been regulated at the state level and that
have been the subject of numerous uniform and model laws
promulgated by the Conference. The states have a
profound interest in, to the extent practicable, having
international conventions mesh with their existing laws,
influencing the law’s development in other countries so that
it is compatible with American legal concepts, and
harmonizing their own laws with the laws of other
countries. This will facilitate transactions and movement
across borders and will provide the citizens of the states a
familiar and appropriate legal framework as they participate
in the global community. For the same reasons it benefits
our citizens and businesses to have uniform state laws, so
too will they benefit by having their state laws work in
harmony with the laws of other nations.66
The ULC’s interest in international laws and agreements grows out of
its mission to ensure that such laws and agreements are not “unduly
disruptive of state interests.”67 As former ULC Executive Director
William Henning has written:
[I]t is not surprising that the ULC and the State
Department’s Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for
Private International Law, known within State as L/PIL,
have developed a close working relationship. Each has a
distinct sphere of interest and there is a tension between
those spheres, yet there is sufficient overlap that a
significant level of cooperation is in the interests of both.68
66. Policy Position on International Activities, UNIF. A CTIVITIES ENEWSLETTER (UNIF. LAW
COMM’N), MAY 2006, Uniform Law Commission, Executive Committee Handbook, Item eIII.I.4. The
handbook. which contains all ULC policies, is continuously updated and a copy of the version in
effect as of January 1, 2020 is on file with William Henning. See Henning, supra note 60, at 41.
67. Henning, supra note 60, at 43.
68. Id. at 43-44.
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This cooperation can be further seen in the presence of senior
members of L/PIL serving as advisory members of the ULC. L/PIL has
also regularly reached out to the ULC, among other stakeholders and
interested parties, for help in formulating negotiating positions, to staff
delegations, and in identifying relevant expertise.69
Although the U.S. Constitution prohibits States from becoming
parties to international conventions, there is nothing in the Constitution
that prevents States from cooperating with the federal government, even
though they are not required to, by implementing them at the State level
through appropriate State legislation unless the Constitution vests the
matter with the federal government.70 Indeed, we will see below the
advantages of developing an implementation plan during international
negotiations for obligations that affect State laws. When there are ULC
products and drafting experience available to facilitate the implementation
process at the State level, this should enhance the ability of the United
States. to ratify such agreements.71
For example, a treaty could be negotiated by federal authorities with
ULC experts serving on the negotiating delegations or otherwise assisting
in the negotiating process, followed by States enacting uniform laws
promulgated by the ULC in cooperation with federal authorities. After
the ground had been prepared in this manner the treaty would be formally
adopted with Senate advice and consent and executive ratification. This
occurred with regard to the Hague Convention on the International
Recovery of Child Support and Other Forms of Family Maintenance
(Child Support Convention), aspects of which are discussed in the ensuing
sections.72 The ULC worked closely with L/PIL and the Office of Child
Support Enforcement (“OCSE”) in the Department of Health and
Human Services to develop the convention; ULC-related experts served
on the negotiating delegation; and the Uniform Interstate Family Support
Act (“UIFSA”), already in effect in every ULC jurisdiction, was amended
to include the substantive provisions of the convention, thereby
empowering the State agencies that collect child support domestically to
do so internationally. The Senate gave its advice and consent and federal
legislation was adopted conditioning federal funding for child support

69. See Curtis R. Reitz, Globalization, International Legal Developments, and Uniform State Laws, 51
LOY. L. REV. 301, 308 (2005).
70. Henning, supra note 60, at 44-45.
71. Reitz, supra note 69, at 327.
72. Mary Helen Carlson, United States Perspective on the New Hague Convention on the International
Recovery of Child Support and Other Forms of Family Maintenance, 43 FAM. L.Q. 21, 26–31 (2009)
(containing an excellent discussion of the project).
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collection in a State on enactment of amended UIFSA in that State.73
Amended UIFSA was enacted in every ULC jurisdiction and the
instrument of ratification was deposited with the Hague Conference on
Private International Law, thereby making the United States a party to the
convention effective January 1, 2017.74
The child-support project was a spectacular success, but in many
instances not all of the events necessary for success will occur and those
that do can occur in various sequences. The ULC might be involved in
some or all of the stages as we note below.
A. The ULC Development and Enactment Process
An understanding of the ULC’s role in international matters requires
an understanding of the organization’s ordinary processes applicable to
the development of domestic State law. The ULC places no restrictions
on where proposals for new projects originate. Proposers are generally
from State bar associations, State governments, private groups, ULC
commissioners, joint and permanent editorial boards,75 and individuals.
Proposals are reviewed by the Committee on Scope and Program, which
makes a recommendation to the Executive Committee as to action. The
possible outcomes of the Scope Committee’s review are:
• Dismiss the proposal as not viable;
• Request that the proposer develop the idea further;

73. 42 U.S.C.A. § 666(f) (“In order to satisfy section 654(20)(A) of this title, each State must
have in effect the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, as approved by the American Bar
Association on February 9, 1993, including any amendments officially adopted as of September 30,
2008 by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.”).
74. For a list of parties to the Convention of 23 November 2007 on the International Recovery
of Child Support and Other Forms of Family Maintenance, see Status Table, HAGUE CONFERENCE
ON
PRIVATE
INT’L
LAW,
https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/statustable/?cid=131 (last visited Jan. 1, 2020).
75. Editorial boards are partnerships with other organizations (most commonly a section of the
American Bar Association but often another professional organization), have their own budgets, are
typically staffed by a scholar with expertise in the area, and often have advisors or liaison members
from organizations that are not formally part of the partnership. The editorial boards are: The
Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code (with the American Law Institute);
Joint Editorial Board for Uniform Real Property Acts (with the American Bar Association’s Real
Property, Trust, and Estate Section, American College of Real Estate Lawyers, American College of
Mortgage Attorneys); Joint Editorial Board for Uniform Family Laws (with American Academy of
Matrimonial Lawyers, Association of Family and Conciliation Courts); Joint Editorial Board for
International Law (with ABA International Law Section); Joint Editorial Board for Uniform
Unincorporated Entity Acts (with the American Bar Association’s Business Law Section); and the
Joint Editorial Board for Uniform Trust and Estate Acts (with the American Bar Association’s Real
Property, Trust, and Estate Section, American College of Trust and Estate Counsel).
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• If the proposal did not originate with a joint or permanent
editorial board, forward it to the appropriate editorial board for
further analysis and recommendation;
• Recommend the formation of a study committee; and
• Recommend the formation of a drafting committee
The normal process was followed with regard to the child- support
project discussed above. The project began when Mary Helen Carlson,
the L/PIL attorney-adviser who headed the U.S. delegation that
negotiated the Child Support Convention, appeared before the Scope and
Program Committee at the ULC’s July 2006 annual meeting to explore
the formation of a drafting committee to integrate the convention into
UIFSA.76 Scope and Program recommended the project to the Executive
Committee, which concluded that it should be undertaken. A drafting
committee was formed in March 2007 that was chaired by Commissioner
Robinson77 and included individuals who were participating in or serving
as observers at the international negotiations in the Hague.78
Understanding the role the ULC plays in international matters
requires an understanding of the painstaking process by which any
uniform act is prepared.79 A project typically begins with a study
committee, consisting of a chair, ULC members, often a reporter drawn
from academia, and an advisory member from the ABA (all ULC study
and drafting committees have ABA advisory members). The study must
be open to non-ULC participants and the organization goes to great
lengths to identify entities and individuals with an interest in the subject
area. Depending on the topic, certain of these “stakeholders” will be
obvious and will have been contacted by the ULC staff before the first
meeting of the committee. Indeed, one of the first steps in many study
projects is a “stakeholders meeting” at which those stakeholders that have
been identified are asked to give their views on whether a proposed
project makes sense, whether the ULC would be the right organization to
draft an act, and whether the stakeholders are willing to participate in the
drafting process. Among the study committee’s ongoing tasks is the
identification and outreach to other stakeholders, including academic
experts who might be willing to participate. The formal ULC term for all
76. See Robinson, supra note 64, at 65.
77. The reporter for the project was Professor John J. Sampson of the University of Texas
School of Law, a noted international expert in the field of family law.
78. Further coordination with the treaty drafting project was seen in the presence of William
Duncan, Deputy Secretary-General of the Hague Conference, who attended the initial session of the
UIFSA drafting committee. See Robinson, supra note 64, at 67.
79. Much of the description of the proceedings was provided by one of the co-authors, who is
a Life Member of the ULC (meaning he has served as a commissioner for at least 20 years and been
elected to life-member status) and served as its Executive Director from 2001 to 2007.
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stakeholders is “observers” but the label is a misnomer — stakeholders
are participants and are encouraged to speak at all committee meetings.
No study or drafting committee is permitted to meet without its
stakeholders being present. Most study committee meetings are held by
phone or, increasingly, by computer platform.
If the study committee recommends a drafting project, it must be
approved by the Committee on Scope and Program and by the Executive
Committee. The composition of the drafting committee will be similar to
the composition of the study committee (ULC chair, reporter - there is
always a reporter on drafting projects), ULC members, ABA advisory
members, and observers). Drafting committees typically meet in person
twice a year — once in the fall and once in the spring — on a Friday and
Saturday. The most common arrangement is for several drafting
committees to meet in the same location, and the leadership of the ULC
participates in the meetings (they rotate from meeting to meeting but all
will be in attendance when critical issues are discussed).80 Each draft is
submitted to the Committee on Style, which tightly edits it according to
the ULC’s style standards. It is important for each of the ULC’s acts to
speak in the same voice and the recommendations of the Committee on
Style are mandatory unless the drafting committee presents a compelling
substantive reason not to implement them.
The ULC holds an annual meeting each summer (usually in July) and
at the meeting each drafting committee sits on a dais and reads its act to
the assembled group of commissioners who have access to microphones
in order to interact with the committee. Many issues are hotly debated. If
the drafting committee will not accept a suggestion for changing the draft
from the floor, the commissioner making the recommendation may make
a motion and, if it is approved, the committee must comply. The floor has
the ultimate say on all acts.
Each act must be read at two or more annual meetings before it can
be approved as a final act of the ULC (on rare occasions, the two-reading
rule has been waived). When a new uniform act is approved by a formal
vote of the States, it is typically forwarded to the ABA with a request for
a resolution of support from the House of Delegates, which is usually
forthcoming. ABA approval is desirable but not required for the act to be
presented to States for enactment. Each uniform act is accompanied by a
set of official comments, which are produced by the chair and reporter.
Although the comments are widely circulated for input before being
80. The leadership consists of the President, the Chair of the Executive Committee (the
presumptive next president), and the Executive Director. The President is a volunteer commissioner
elected by a majority vote of the commissioners and serves a two-year term. The Chair of the
Executive Committee is also a volunteer commissioner and is appointed by the President. The
Executive Director is a professional employee of the ULC.
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finalized, they are not approved by the floor. If an act is approved at an
annual meeting in July, the comments are typically complete by October
so that the act can be available to states in the legislative session beginning
the next January.
The enactment process is overseen by the Legislative Committee,
which consists of a chair and a group of commissioners with experience
in the legislative process. Members of the committee often have
experience as legislators or lobbyists. There is a liaison member from each
State’s delegation of commissioners. The Legislative Committee is
supported by a staff consisting of a chief counsel, a
program/communications director, and several attorneys. The Legislative
Committee develops a plan for the enactment of each uniform act.
Gaining enactment is difficult even though commissioners from each
State are obligated “to procure consideration by the legislature of the
State, unless the commissioners consider the act inappropriate for
enactment in their state.”81 A legislator in each State must be identified
who will sponsor the act — ideally there will be a sponsor in each house
of the legislature.
It is surprisingly difficult to find sponsors for
“good government” types of acts. A legislator may only have an
opportunity to introduce one or two bills during a session and will want
to be sure they are on topics that will be perceived as important by
constituents. Because the ULC has a delegation from each State that has
been appointed by the political authorities within the State, good
connections to legislators exist and this facilitates the introduction of acts.
ULC permanent staff assigned to the enactment process get to know
some legislators in various States who can be counted on to be supportive
of ULC acts.
Despite the sustained and regular engagement with stakeholders,
opposition can still emerge. If the opposition is organized it can prevent
enactment. The solution is sometimes to negotiate with the opposition
and modify the act to meet the concerns but only in a manner that is
consistent with sound public policy. This slows the process down as any
substantive modifications have to be approved by all commissioners
(there are streamlined procedures for obtaining approval in limited
circumstances, but they still take time). Often, an act will first be referred
to a state bar association, which will form a committee to review it and
make recommendations to the legislature. This can be extremely helpful
but is also time consuming.
81. UNIF. LAW COMM’N, EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE HANDBOOK, ITEM III.C, POLICY
ESTABLISHING CRITERIA AND PROCEDURES FOR DESIGNATION AND CONSIDERATION OF ACTS
¶ 5 (2018), reprinted in UNIF. LAW COMM’N, 2018-2019 REFERENCE BOOK 185 (2018). The
Reference Book is not distributed to libraries or posted online but is an invaluable resource, with
copies sent to all commissioners and to anyone else upon request.
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The most successful enactment strategy involves a coordinated
campaign by the ULC and the stakeholders that have participated in the
drafting of the act and have become convinced of the importance of
enactment. The ULC obtains support letters from stakeholders and,
whenever possible, the stakeholders are asked to assist with a lobbying
effort. There are times when a uniform act is highly successful —
occasionally gaining enactment in all States, sometimes in forty or more
States. The ULC considers an act to have been successful if it is enacted
in fifteen to twenty States. Some of the acts gain only a handful of
enactments and some are not enacted anywhere.
A. ULC Participation in Treaty Negotiation and Domestic Implementation
The above discussion should not be understood to suggest that the
ULC only becomes involved when treaty negotiations are underway or to
suggest that implementation must occur through uniform legislation. The
ULC has a robust relationship with L/PIL and often becomes involved
at a much earlier stage and in a variety of ways. An understanding of these
points requires an understanding of the ULC’s internal structure as
applied to international issues.82
An important element of the ULC’s international efforts is the Joint
Editorial Board for International Law (“JEB/IL”), a partnership between
the ULC and the ABA Section on International Law that was created in
2007 and charged with (1) recommending as appropriate the adoption of
uniform State laws on international and transnational subjects; (2)
advising and assisting the federal government in international
negotiations; (3) promoting education about the rule of law and the
harmonization of law at the international level; and (4) furthering the goals
of the ULC and the ABA section.83
Representatives of L/PIL regularly attend meetings of the JEB/IL to
brief the members on existing and prospective projects and to assist in
fulfilling the board’s responsibilities. Recently, Peter Lown, former
President of the Uniform Law Conference of Canada,84 joined the
82. For an excellent and thorough discussion of the history of the ULC’s international activities,
see ROBERT A. STEIN, FORMING A MORE PERFECT U NION: A HISTORY OF THE U NIFORM LAW
COMMISSION, ch. 10 (2013).
83. Memorandum of Understanding from the Joint Editorial Board for International Law (Jan.
3, 2007).
84. The ULC has a longstanding and very close relationship with the Uniform Law Conference
of Canada (ULCC). The President of the ULCC regularly attends and makes a presentation at the
annual meeting of the ULC and the ULC President does likewise with regard to the ULCC’s annual
meeting. The ULC also has a close relationship with the Mexican Center for Uniform Law. The ULC
and the ULCC have undertaken multiple joint drafting projects in an attempt to harmonize the laws
of the two countries and the Mexican Center has often participated. A standing charge to the ULC’s
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JEB/IL as Director of Research, greatly strengthening its capacity to
make informed recommendations. The ULC’s International Legal
Developments Committee is charged with serving as liaison to the ULC’s
Canadian and Mexican counterparts and to the State Department. The
committee reviews proposed international projects, often relying on
reports from the JEB/IL, and makes recommendations to the Executive
Committee.
The ULC often becomes involved when an international project
undertaken by the State Department is in the negotiation stage and
sometimes earlier. For example, L/PIL consulted with the ULC on the
advisability of undertaking the project that ultimately led to the 2019 U.N.
Convention on International Settlement Agreements Resulting from
Mediation85 (Singapore Mediation Convention), which deals with the
recognition and enforcement of international mediated settlement
agreements. The ULC president appointed a working group to study the
matter and to advise L/PIL on the advisability of the project. The working
group continued to advise L/PIL after the project commenced at the
U.N. Commission on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”), and
former ULC President Harriet Lansing, who chaired the working group,
served as a government expert on the U.S. delegation that negotiated the
convention.
By becoming involved in international negotiations on a subject for
which the ULC had developed a uniform act, commissioners and former
reporters involved with the drafting of that act or who are otherwise
experts in the field can contribute their knowledge and experience dealing
with legislative and policy issues required to harmonize laws in the State
jurisdictions on that particular subject. For example, Commissioner
Lansing was able to bring expertise gained through the process of
developing the ULC’s Uniform Mediation Act86 to the negotiations that
led to the promulgation of the Singapore Mediation Convention.
As with Commissioner Lansing, representatives with ULC experience
are often included as government experts on U.S. delegations to
negotiations of particular conventions that would affect State laws, such
as the U.N. Convention on the Assignment of Receivables, which is
Scope and Program and Executive Committees when considering international projects is to ask
whether the project might be appropriate for collaboration with its Canadian and Mexican
counterparts.
85. See U.N. Convention on International Settlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation,
G.A. Res. 73/199 (Dec. 20, 2018).
86. The Uniform Mediation Act (UMA) was approved in 2001 and the next year UNCITRAL
promulgated the Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation. Responding to this
development, the ULC amended UMA Section 11 in 2003 to encourage parties from different
countries to mediate commercial disputes in accordance with the UN Model Law. See NAT’L CONF.
COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM ST. LAWS, UNIFORM MEDIATION ACT § 11, prefatory note (2003).
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discussed further below. As noted above, this occurred in the drafting of
the Child Support Convention, where both Commissioner Robinson and
Professor Sampson, the chair and reporter of the drafting committee that
amended UIFSA, served on the negotiating delegation.
Another example of this synergy may be found in the drafting of
UNIDROIT’s Convention on International Interests in Mobile
Equipment (Capetown Convention), especially its Protocol on Matters
Specific to Aircraft Equipment,87 which drew on the ULC’s experience
revising Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code on secured
transactions. Professor Charles Mooney of the University of Pennsylvania
Law School, who was co-reporter for the revision of Article 9 and
Commissioner Edwin E. Smith, who was a member of the drafting
committee for the revision, served on the U.S. delegation that negotiated
the convention.88
The Child Support Convention, discussed above, is the most
successful example of the partnership between the ULC and the State
Department and the only example to date of an international private law
convention being ratified by the United States but implemented in large
measure by a uniform law enacted in every State. Much of its success is
owed to the exceptional process developed jointly by the ULC and its
federal partners, L/PIL and OCSE. All delegation members met
throughout the negotiating period to coordinate the U.S. position. The
U.S. delegation also held meetings throughout the negotiating period
“with relevant private sector stakeholders and government entities to
obtain the requisite expertise and guidance on both the general direction
the United States should take in this negotiation and the specific positions
the U.S. delegation should pursue.”89
The Secretary of State’s Advisory Committee on Private International
Law organized a Study Group on International Child Support that held
regular meetings open to the public and announced through the Federal
Register. Members of the U.S. delegation made presentations at training
sessions for State and local child support officials and at meetings of the
ULC, National Child Support Enforcement Association, and the ABA.
As Carlson noted:

87. The Aircraft Protocol to the Convention, commonly known as the Capetown Convention,
has been ratified by the United States as a self-executing treaty. See Protocol to the Convention on
International Interests in Mobile Equipment on Matters Specific to Aircraft Equipment – Status, UNIDROIT
https://www.unidroit.org/status-2001capetown-aircraft (last visited Jan. 1, 2020). The other
protocols to the convention (rail and space) have not been, and are unlikely to be, ratified. A fourth
protocol on mining, agricultural, and construction equipment is currently being negotiated and
Professor Mooney is participating as a U.S. delegate.
88. Reitz, supra note 69, at 311.
89. Carlson, supra note 72, at 25.
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The goal of this inclusive process was to include every
interest group in the process of developing the U.S. position
on the legal and policy issues that arose in this negotiation.
It was of paramount importance to the U.S. delegation that
no one was left out and that every interested party had an
opportunity to be heard. The U.S. delegation wanted to
produce a Convention that met the needs of America’s
families, children, and the child support community, and
one that that community would broadly and strongly
support during the ratification process.90
In a similar manner, former ULC Executive Director William
Henning and Professor Neil Cohen of Brooklyn Law School91 are
longtime members of the U.S. delegation to Working Group VI of
UNCITRAL that produced the U.N. Model Law on Secured Transactions
in 2016, the Enactment Guide to the U.N. Model Law on Secured
Transactions in 2017, and the Practice Guide to the Model Law on
Secured Transactions in 2019. Secured transactions reform in developing
countries is among the highest priorities of both UNCITRAL and the
World Bank and the model law is an important instrument in furthering
the reform efforts.
The U.S. delegation to Working Group IV of UNCITRAL is part of
a broader team that attends the meetings, typically a week in Vienna in
late fall and a week in New York City in mid-spring, under the flags of
various NGOs. Organizations represented in these negotiations include
the American Bar Association, the Commercial Finance Association
(which consists of members engaged in asset-based securitization
transactions), the International Insolvency Institute, and the National Law
Center. The team collaborates extensively, both in preparing for the
meetings and at the meetings.
The primary job of a government expert is to provide subject matter
expertise. A great deal of effort goes into preparing for the UNCITRAL
meetings. The U.N. Secretariat produces a new draft for each meeting,
based on decisions made at the previous meeting. Those decisions are set
90. Id.
91. Jeffrey D. Forchelli Professor of Law. Professor Cohen is not a commissioner but his ties
to the ULC run deep. He is a member of and Research Director for the Permanent Editorial Board
for the Uniform Commercial Code, a frequent member of drafting committees revising articles of
the UCC (including serving as co-reporter for the 2004 revision of Article 1), and he has served as an
American Law Institute representative to ULC drafting projects that implicate the UCC in some
manner, such as the 2015 revisions to the Model Tribal Secured Transactions Act and the Revised
Uniform Landlord and Tenant Act. Professor Cohen’s service on the U.S. delegation dates back to
the 1990s when he participated in the development of the U.N. Convention on the Assignment of
Receivables.

132

VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[60:1:102

out in a report that is produced during the meeting at which they are made
and approved by the delegates. As delegates prepare for a new meeting,
they review the report from the previous meeting and the new draft that
was prepared in light of the report. Suggestions for changes are made to
the draft. Delegates then hold a series of telephone conferences, often
lasting for hours, with the full U.S. team (including NGOs) going through
the draft line by line. All involved make suggestions for drafting clarity
that are provided privately to the Secretariat rather than publicly
presenting them on the floor. Delegates, including the non-government
experts, also make suggestions for substantive changes that the delegation
hopes to achieve during the next meeting. Sometimes the changes merit
the preparation of a working paper to be distributed to all delegations
ahead of the meeting. This approach allows for input from other
delegations and the opportunity to lobby them to join an effort. ULC
members might speak on behalf of the U.S. government on certain issues
in their expertise, and they have the opportunity to learn the positions of
other State representatives and thereby potentially influence future
drafting by the ULC.92
The week-long UNCITRAL meetings are divided into sessions — a
morning and afternoon session on Monday through Thursday and a
morning session on Friday. The afternoon session on Friday is reserved
for the reading and approval of the report of the proceedings. There is
typically a special Experts Meeting on Saturday to which some experts
from delegations and NGOs are invited and all government officials are
excluded. U.S. experts have attended. The purpose of the meeting is to
help the Secretariat work through the most complicated issues that it will
have to deal with in the next draft. At the Experts Meeting, those in
attendance are expected to take off their hats as state delegates and
provide the best technical advice possible. The Experts Meeting is never
referred to on the floor of UNCITRAL — because not every delegate is
invited to attend and official recognition might ruffle some feathers. The
Secretariat takes advantage of the experts in developing the next draft,
often sending out advance drafts and asking for input. The drafts are not
shared with the government delegates. As Henning noted, “we are acting
on these occasions, with the permission of the United States, as U.N.
experts.”93 The involvement of recognized experts helps to build
confidence among domestic constituencies that U.S. interests and
practices are duly considered in the negotiating process. This process of
92. E-mail from William Henning, Life Member, Uniform Law Commission, to Charlotte
Ku, Professor, Texas A&M University School of Law (Sept. 9, 2018, 10:00 EDT) (on file with
authors).
93. Id.
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engagement with experts, stakeholders, and interested parties, including
the public, occurs as a matter of general practice through the Secretary of
State’s Advisory Committee on Private International Law that meets on a
periodic basis.94
The participation of ULC experts during the negotiations of
international law conventions and other international instruments
improves the quality of the conventions and instruments and makes them
more congruent with existing State law. When it comes to the domestic
implementation of a convention in an area that is the subject of existing
uniform State legislation, the ULC’s preferred approach is a collaborative
effort with the State Department and other affected federal agencies
resulting in ratification at the federal level but implementation in whole
or in part at the State level through the development and enactment of a
uniform law. This approach was used successfully with the Child Support
Convention but it failed with the Wills Convention. Uniform State
legislation, however, is only one of the ways in which the ULC can affect
domestic implementation. Another, and very important method, is
described below in connection with the discussion of the U.N.
Convention on the Assignment of Receivables.
A. The United States and Analogues in Other Federal Systems
Although the analysis is confined to the United States, issues of
subnational implementation are faced in other federal government
systems. Specifically, Australia, Canada, India, Brazil, and Mexico, to
name some of the most prominent examples, have multiple levels of
government below the national level. For example, Canada is divided
into provinces, each with its own government and sets of responsibilities.
Like the United States, Canada has the Uniform Law Commission of
Canada (ULCC), Australia has a federally funded office, and Mexico has
a Uniform Law Committee.
The specifics of subnational treaty implementation in those countries
are unique to the constitutional and other legal parameters found there.
Nevertheless, a comparison with the United States on several dimensions
reveals a particularly high bar for achieving subnational implementation
in the United States. At the outset, the U.S. Constitution requires that no
treaty be made without the advice and consent of the Senate, and that the
treaty may be ratified only with concurrence of two thirds of the Senate.95
That level of support is difficult to achieve under the best of
94. See Office of the Legal Adviser, Advisory Committee on Private International Law, U.S. DEP’T OF
STATE, https://www.state.gov/advisory-committee-on-private-international-law/ (last visited Jan. 1,
2020).
95. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
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circumstances, but the polarization of American political parties in the last
decade, combined with frequent divided partisan rule between the
executive and Congress, might make this hurdle particularly challenging.
In contrast, the federal authorities of Canada and Australia have
evolved practices of coordination among and consultation with their
subnational units prior to undertaking treaty negotiations. In Canada,
treaty-making is “a prerogative power that has remained with the
sovereign, that is, the ‘crown in right of Canada.’” 96 Since 1947, this
power has been delegated to the Governor General of Canada. The
Governor General exercises this power on the advice of ministers —
principally the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Trade in the
case of treaty making per Section 10 of the Department of Foreign Affairs
and International Trade Act.97 Treaties do not automatically become the
law of the land in Canada. If a change in existing law is required, the
federal or provincial legislatures will need to act “depending on which
level of government has general legislative competence in the relevant
field as set out in the constitution.”98 This was underscored in a 1937 Privy
Council decision generally known as the “Labour Conventions case.”99
The Canadian federal government begins a consultation process with
the provinces to identify interested parties and relevant issues when it
considers entering into a treaty of importance. The level of coordination
and authorization will depend on the nature of the treaty. For matters of
national significance that cut across several departments and require
change to existing law, a policy decision of the Cabinet is required. For
areas such as mutual legal assistance treaties that fit into existing statutes,
and do not raise policy issues, the level of authorization is lower.
Nevertheless, the making of all treaties in Canada requires “formal legal
authority for their execution.”100 This consultation is overseen by the
Privy Council Office which has been described as essentially the Prime
Minister’s department.101 Government departments and agencies may
also be involved in these initial consultations.
Once this exploratory phase is completed, the Department of Foreign
Affairs presents a “Memorandum to Cabinet” to secure political
endorsement to embark on negotiations. The memorandum “analyzes the
issues and risks related to the proposed agreement, includes the results of
any environmental assessments and suggests guidelines for the
96. Maurice Copithorne, National Treaty Law and Practice: Canada, 33 STUD. TRANSNAT’L LEGAL
POL’Y 1 (2003).
97. Dep’t of Foreign Affairs and Int’l Trade Act, R.S.C. 1985, c E-22 (2013).
98. Copithorne, supra note 96, at 1.
99. Id. at 4.
100. Id. at 3.
101. France Morrissette, Provincial Involvement in International Treaty Making: The European Union as
a Possible Model, 37 QUEEN’S L.J. 577, 580 (2012).
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negotiations. With this information, the Cabinet then finalizes and
endorses the negotiation mandate.”102 Once negotiations are completed,
the federal government can commit Canada to an international
agreement. The power to enter into treaties, however, “did not
automatically give [the federal government] a right to implement a treaty
if its subject matter fell within provincial jurisdiction.”103
Since the mid-1970s, ad hoc federal-provincial committees of deputy
ministers have been established to serve as a consultation mechanism for
the negotiation and implementation of treaties like free trade agreements.
The practice became more permanent in 1986 on conclusion of an
agreement between federal and provincial authorities to create a
mechanism for regular consultation among first ministers in order to
monitor ongoing negotiations. Negotiating positions were also developed
in consultation with the premiers and provincial trade ministers in the case
of trade negotiations.104 A similar mechanism for ongoing federal and
provincial consultation used for officials responsible for human rights.
When no specific legislation is enacted, the federal government may
accept assurances from the provinces “deemed sufficient for the federal
Government to accede to the treaties.”105
The Canadian federal government, in principle, will not ratify a treaty
on a subject that falls within provincial jurisdiction until relevant
provincial implementing legislation is enacted.106 In practice, however, the
federal Government has three options if a province chooses not to
participate in a treaty regime.
First, the federal Government can withhold accession or ratification
until all provinces enact required legislation. Second, some treaties may
contain a “federal State” clause that allows the federal State to participate
on a partial basis, i.e. participation to “the extent to which its political
subunits have implemented the provisions of a treaty.”107 The final option
is for the federal State to enter a reservation to the treaty indicating which

102. Id. at 581; see also International Trade Agreements and Local Government: A Guide for Canadian
Municipalities, GLOBAL AFFAIRS CANADA, https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreementsaccords-commerciaux/ressources/fcm/complete-guide-complet.aspx?lang=eng (last visited Jan. 1,
2020). For information on the Memorandum to Cabinet process, see PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE, A
DRAFTER’S GUIDE TO CABINET DOCUMENTS (2013), https://www.canada.ca/en/privycouncil/services/publications/memoranda-cabinet/drafters-guide-documents.html.
103. Morrissette, supra note 101, at 584.
104. Id. at 585.
105. Copithorne, supra note 96, at 6.
106. Morrissette, supra note 101, at 595.
107. Copithorne, supra note 96, at 6. For example, Article 93 of the 1980 United Nations
Convention on the International Sale of Goods permits such a practice, but it has never been used
by the United States.
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provinces decline to be bound where the treaty in question permits such
a reservation although such provisions have become increasingly rare.108
The province of Alberta, for example, initially declined to be bound
by the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child. (It has changed its
position and is now bound.)109 Canada’s system of consultation now also
includes engaging with the public through parliamentary committees or
other forms of consultation like the standing external consultative
committee of the Department of Justice that advises principally on private
international law treaties. The government is not bound to accept any of
the advice provided and “the extent to which their recommendations are
taken into account varies significantly.”110
In Australia, Section 61 of the Constitution gives the federal executive
the authority to enter into treaties.111 Parliament, however, retains its
legislative authority to incorporate treaty provisions into the domestic law
of Australia.112 In the 1980s, Australian parliamentarians initiated a review
of Australia’s treaty-making process and specifically the role of the
legislature in that process. The move was thought in some quarters to be
unnecessary because Australia had generally followed UK practice where
no treaties are self-executing. All treaties require domestic implementation
in order to have legal effect. Nevertheless, by 1996, a series of treatymaking reforms were enacted to institutionalize notice and consultation
with parliament and the states as follows:

• The tabling in Parliament of all treaty actions
proposed by the government for at least fifteen joint
sitting days before binding treaty action is taken;
• The preparation of a National Interest Analysis
(“NIA”) for each treaty, outlining information regarding
the obligations contained in the treaty and the benefits
for Australia of entering into the treaty – the NIA must
be tabled in Parliament and published on the internet;
• The establishment of the parliamentary Joint
Standing Committee on Treaties (“JSCOT”), comprising
sixteen members from government, opposition and
minority parties, to inquire into and make
108. See David Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical Foundations of the Nationalist
Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1075, 1273 (2000) (citing to RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 302 reporter’s note 4 (AM. LAW INST.
1987)).
109. Copithorne, supra note 96, at 7.
110. Id.
111. Australian Constitution s 61.
112. DONALD R. ROTHWELL & EMILY CRAWFORD, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN AUSTRALIA 51
(3d ed. 2017).
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recommendations in relation to Australia’s entry into
treaties
• The establishment of the Treaties Council,
comprising the Prime Minister, Premiers and Chief
Ministers and an enhanced role for the
Commonwealth/state and territory Standing Committee
on Treaties (“SCOT”) to improve the quality of state and
territory participation in the treaty-making process, and
• The establishment of the Australian Treaties
Library, providing online access to all Australian treaty
texts.113
In Germany, the treaty-making power is vested in the federal
government by Basic Law, Articles 32(1), 73(1), 87(1) as “the sole
institution to handle administrative affairs abroad and conduct diplomatic
and consular relations.”114 The Basic Law was silent, however, on what
happens if a treaty touches on subjects within the competence of the
Laender — the sixteen states that comprise the Federal Republic of
Germany. This gap was filled by an arrangement concluded between the
Federal and Land Governments — the governments of the Laender —
on November 14, 1957, called the Lindau Agreement. That agreement
acknowledges that there are areas of treaty-making that might be
exclusively federal. These would include consular treaties, treaties on
commerce and navigation, and treaties acceding to international
organizations. Where treaties do touch on matters within the competence
of the Laender; the agreement sets out a consultation process as follows:
• The Laender shall be informed at the earliest date
possible of the proposed conclusion of such treaties so
that they can make their wishes known in good time; and
• A permanent body of Laender representatives shall
be set up which shall be available for consultation by the
Federal Foreign Office or the competent federal ministry
during negotiations on international treaties.115

113. Id. at 56.
114. See Hans D. Treviranus & Hubert Beemelmans, National Treaty Law and Practice: Federal
Republic of Germany, in 27 AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L LAW, NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE:
FRANCE, GERMANY, INDIA, SWITZERLAND, THAILAND, UNITED KINGDOM 54 (Monroe Leigh &
Merritt R. Blakeslee eds., 1995).
115. Id. at 65.
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India is a federal state but has been described as a federal structure
with unitary features.116 The Constitution of India confers on the federal
government “the entire field of foreign affairs.”117 The Indian Parliament
“has exclusive power to legislate on foreign affairs and on all matters
which bring the Union into relations with a foreign country.”118 For
treaty-making and implementation, the question then is one of whether
legislation is required to implement the terms of a treaty and not of what
level of government (i.e., either federal or state) will implement the treaty.
In contrast to India, the Confederation of Switzerland is a strong
federal and highly consultative state where the executive, legislature, and
Cantons are all involved in shaping external relations and treaty
negotiation and implementation.119 “[A] consensus with the cantons and
all interested groups is sought before a treaty is submitted with a view to
approval and ratification.”120 Mechanisms for consultation have also been
set up like the Contact Committee made up of the Federal Minister of
Justice and Police and members of all cantonal governments to focus on
issues related to the European Union and its repercussions on
Switzerland. This group has evolved into the Conference of the
Governments of the Cantons that coordinates cantonal policies and views
related to cross-border relations.121
Apart from these constitutional and procedural differences, the
number of subnational government units that would have to adopt treatyimplementing legislation can be a significant complicating factor.
Australia has only six, Canada has ten, Switzerland and Brazil each have
twenty-six, India has twenty-nine, Mexico has thirty-one, and the United
States has fifty (not including other subnational units such as Puerto Rico
and the District of Columbia, along with the non-self-governing
territories of Guam, the Virgin Islands, and American Samoa).
The greater number of federal units that must approve, the greater
the likelihood that full coverage will not be achieved; that is, one or more
units are likely to choose not to pass the necessary legislation or create
rules that do not match well with those of other states and provinces.
Even if all subunits vote to implement the treaty, the time frame under

116. K. Thakore, National Treaty Law and Practice: India, in A M. SOC’Y OF INT’L LAW, supra note
115, at 79.
117. Id. at 80.
118. Id.
119. Luzius Wildhaber, Eva Kornicker, & Adrian Scheidegger, in AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L LAW ,
supra note 115, at 126.
120.
THE
CONFERENCE
OF
CANTONAL
GOVERNMENTS ,
https://www.eda.admin.ch/missions/mission-eubrussels/en/home/organisation/sections/conference-cantonal.html. (last visited Jan. 1, 2020).
121. Wildhaber et al., supra note 120, at 128.
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which this is all achieved, ceteris paribus, is longer when there are more
subunits.
In the United States, despite incentives and established processes, the
net result could represent something of a patchwork in terms of
subnational implementation. Some agreements might be fully operational
at the State level, others might be partly implemented (some States have
passed the necessary legislation whereas others have not), and other
treaties remain nearly or completely in non-implementation stage because
States have not enacted the necessary legislation. What distinguishes these
groups of outcomes and how might the suboptimal results be redressed?
These are the subjects of the next sections.

V. SUCCESS AND FAILURE IN SUBNATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION
In this Part, we examine two cases that represent the variation of
subnational implementation of treaties in the United States. In the short
term, and the standard adopted here, success is defined as securing
adoption of legislation by States and then ratification of a treaty at the
federal level. We acknowledge that a more stringent benchmark would
involve an evaluation of whether such legislation was effective in meeting
the goals of the treaty; unfortunately, this would require a long-term
assessment of agreements and legislation that are in their nascent stage
and is outside the scope of this Article.
The Hague Convention on the International Recovery of Child
Support and Other Forms of Family Maintenance122 can be considered a
success story in that the United States was able to deposit its ratification
after each State adopted revisions to the UIFSA, a common set of
standards that comply with the substantive obligations of the treaty and
effectively implement them. In contrast, the Convention Providing a
Uniform Law on the Form of an International Will, more commonly
known as the Washington Convention,123 is an example in which
subnational implementation has thus far been unsuccessful as only a
minority of States has enacted suitable legislation and the agreement has
not received U.S. ratification. In the Sections below, we review both of
these agreements and subsequent implementation outcomes. We then
conclude with some lessons concerning the conditions for success (and
failure) of subnational implementation.

122. Hague Convention on International Recovery of Child Support and Other Forms of
Family Maintenance, Nov. 23, 2007, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 110-21, 2955 U.N.T.S. 81.
123. Convention Providing a Uniform Law on the Form of an International Will, Oct. 26, 1973,
S. TREATY DOC. NO. 99-29.
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A. The Hague Convention on the International Recovery of Child Support and Other
Forms of Family Maintenance
The Hague Conference on Private International Law adopted the
Convention on November 23, 2007, and on that date the United States
became the first country to sign it. The instrument of ratification was
deposited on September 7, 2016, and the Convention became effective in
the United States on January 1, 2017. The Convention establishes “a
comprehensive system of administrative cooperation among nations with
respect to support and the adoption of a system for the recognition and
enforcement of support orders across national boundaries.”124 Successful
ratification was the culmination of an unprecedented collaborative effort
involving L/PIL, the ULC, and OCSE.
In the United States, collection of child support across state
boundaries is routinely and efficiently accomplished through the UIFSA,
a product of the ULC. UIFSA was first promulgated in 1992 and was
amended in 1996 at the time Congress was implementing welfare reform
through the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act. This act amended Title IV of the Social Security Act,
which authorizes the Child Support Enforcement Program under which
federal funds are provided to the States to assist with the collection of
child support, to require that States adopt the 1996 version of UIFSA in
precisely the form promulgated by the ULC in order to be eligible for
continued federal funding. This technique, known as conditional
spending, has been approved by the U.S. Supreme Court subject to certain
conditions.125
While UIFSA established a federal U.S. mechanism for the collection
of child support across State lines, there was an increasing need to collect
child support across international boundaries. Hence, there was a need to
craft an international agreement that provided cooperation among
countries, often with different legal systems. The Child Support
Convention is not self-executing; rather, it is largely implemented by State
law with federal law playing a crucial role. L/PIL concluded that
implementation through federal law would be less than optimal because
it would require the creation of a new federal bureaucracy to administer
the collection of child support. Instead, UIFSA was revised in 2008 to
accommodate international collections under the convention. The Senate
124. Robinson, supra note 64, at 61-62.
125. The constitutional basis for conditional spending is the Spending Clause. U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 8, cl. 1. In New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), the Supreme Court held that Congress
cannot commandeer state legislatures and dictate that they approve a law but it can condition funding
on state adoption of a law. Id.; see also South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207-08 (1987) (establishing
four requirements that must be met for conditional spending to be constitutional).
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gave its advice and consent in 2010, and in 2014 federal law was amended
to require that States, as a condition of continued federal funding, adopt
UIFSA 2008 in precisely the form promulgated by the ULC. The
instrument of ratification was deposited only after each State adopted
UIFSA 2008. Full State adoption was achieved in early 2016.126
A. The Washington Convention of 1973 (Recognition of International Wills)
The Convention Providing a Uniform Law on the Form of an
International Will, more commonly known as the Washington
Convention, was promulgated by UNIDROIT in 1973. It deals with a
common problem — the need for a will prepared pursuant to the
domestic law of one country to be recognized in another country. To
achieve this result, the domestic law of a country that is a party to the
convention must reflect the substantive rules regarding the form (and
registration) of an international will that are found in the convention.
Rather than relying on choice-of-law rules to determine whether a will
created under the laws of one country is effective in another, the
convention created a national rule under which a will that conforms to
the requirements of the convention must be recognized in each member
country. A party to the agreement must introduce into its law the Uniform
Law on the Form of an International Will that is attached as an Annex to
the Convention. The convention permits a party to limit its effect to those
subnational units that pass conforming legislation, but the United States
declined to take this option.127
Although it would be possible, legally and practically, for the
convention to be implemented purely at the federal level, from the
standpoint of the States this is not desirable. The subject of wills has
historically been reserved to the States, and the ULC and the State
Department agreed that it would be best if the States themselves adopted
the substantive rules of the convention. To that end, the ULC
promulgated the Uniform Wills Recognition Act in 1977. The act
incorporates the substantive rules of the convention into the law of an
enacting State.
In many ways, this is a suitable companion case to the Hague
Convention on child support in that the convention addresses a similar
problem of families living across national boundaries and the associated
need to coordinate legal processes and recognition of court orders. In the
case of the Washington Convention, however, implementation through a
126. For more on this process and experience, see Henning, supra note 60.
127. Amelia H. Boss, The Future of the Uniform Commercial Code Process in an Increasingly International
World, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 349, 381 (2007).
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uniform act can largely be judged a failure to date. The act was adopted
in fifteen States and the District of Columbia during the twenty years
following its promulgation, but by the late 1990s enactment efforts had
essentially ended. The reasons for the cessation of efforts is not entirely
clear and may relate to the different expectations of the ULC and the State
Department.
The ULC considered its efforts sufficiently successful for the
convention to be submitted to the U.S. Senate. It was thought that Senate
advice and consent might have encouraged other States to adopt the
uniform act. At the same time, the State Department was reluctant to ask
the President to transmit the convention to the Senate (anticipating that
the Senate would be disinclined to act upon it) without clear assurance
that the rest of the States would in fact implement its provisions by
adopting the uniform act. The experience indicates the importance not
only of having a clear understanding of expectations at the outset of a
project but also of achieving the necessary basis for U.S. compliance with
its international obligations. Both considerations were important
elements in the planning for the child-support convention. The ULC
revisited the international wills area in 2007 and developed a report
indicating that ratification of the convention remained in the interests of
U.S. citizens and that the Uniform Wills Recognition Act was still an
appropriate vehicle upon which to proceed.128 This gained enactment by
three more States and the U.S. Virgin Islands in 2009 and 2010 but there
has been no further activity since then.
A. Lessons for Successful Subnational Implementation of Treaties
How did two very similar treaties produce divergent outcomes in
terms of subnational implementation by States? It wasn’t necessarily that
one treaty was in the interests of the States and the other less so. Both
addressed a clear problem stemming from families located in different
parts of the world: the validity of legal rulings and documents across
national borders. Generally, the United States would not have agreed to
the conventions had there not been strong and clear perceived benefits.
The difference between the two cases must lie with other conditions.
The clearest difference was the financial incentives for the States.
Federal legislation made adoption of UIFSA 2008 a condition of
continued federal funding of child support recovery efforts. Thus, prompt
action by a State was in its interest; a failure by any State to act quickly
128. Memorandum from David English, Executive Director, Joint Editorial Board for
Uniform Trust and Estate Acts to the Annual Meeting of the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (July 31, 2007) (on file with authors).
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would result in significant penalties. It is perhaps not surprising, therefore,
that the Hague Convention was successful in finding its way into the
legislation of all States. By contrast, adherence to the Washington
Convention offered no similar (financial) incentive; indeed, many States
did not seem to view it as providing a particular benefit (or of resolving a
particular problem), and therefore saw no cost to inaction.
These differences had a precipitating and reinforcing effect on
another key factor: the speed of the subnational implementation process.
The financial incentives reduced the uncertainty for a given State that
others would adopt the law and therefore it was easier to take the risk of
adopting new legislation knowing that others were highly likely to follow.
The rapid succession of State adoptions also created a cascading effect
that not only further sped up the process but increased the probability of
each successive adoption. The Convention on Wills offered no such
advantage and the movement toward adopting the relevant uniform law
suffered over time. States became increasingly reluctant to change their
laws because of their doubts about the ultimate ratification of the
convention.
In the case of child support, adoption of the uniform legislation was
also relatively easy for State legislatures because the Convention’s
provisions fit snugly with many existing processes and provisions. For
example, the Convention recognizes U.S. due process. In addition, the
provisions allow for the challenge of a foreign support order that did not
include a process involving notice and a hearing. Any foreign orders had
to comply with U.S. jurisdictional rules. The treaty also requires countries
to provide free legal assistance in the recognition and implementation of
existing child support orders, something that is already present in the
United States. These were reassuring provisions to lawmakers who feared
foreign laws and practices being imposed on Americans. In 2016, the
Department of Health and Human Services reported 15.6 million
individuals served by its Office of Child Support Enforcement and $33
billion in child support payments collected now, including a portion
coming from outside the United States.129
The Convention dealing with child support is the only fully successful
case of U.S. subnational implementation of an international agreement.
Despite the ULC’s federal-State endeavors, it is not clear how often the
conditions for success will be duplicated with respect to other treaties.

VI. ARE SELF-EXECUTING TREATIES THE SOLUTION?

129. U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILD SUPPORT REPORT 1 (2017).
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The analyses above suggest that relying on subnational
implementation, especially in the United States, can be a risky strategy. Is
there a better way to avoid this step in ensuring the implementation of
international treaties?
One possible solution is to adopt treaties on a self-executing basis, so
that they automatically become part of national law without the need for
enacting legislation at either the national or subnational levels. As we have
seen with the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, however, when
treaty obligations are not transformed into directly enforceable local law,
implementation can be spotty and incomplete. Furthermore, this is not
the common approach in recent practice, at least in terms of replacing
current U.S. law, even without considering whether federalism issues
arise.130
In areas in which self-executing agreements are practical, does
adoption on a self-executing basis necessarily solve the problems noted
above? As with the previous Part, we offer two examples of self-executing
agreements, one a success in obviating the need for subnational
implementation (Convention on the Assignment of Receivables in
International Trade)131 and the other that has been suboptimal in having
its intended effect at the subnational level (UN Convention on Contracts
for the International Sale of Goods).132 We end this Part with a cautionary
note about the limitations of self-executing agreements as an alternative
to subnational implementation.
A. Convention on the Assignment of Receivables in International Trade
A lender that takes as security an assignment of its borrower’s
receivables must be certain that its right to collect from debtors will be
protected against third parties, including another lender with an interest
in the receivables as collateral, a buyer of the receivables, an unsecured
creditor of the borrower, and most notably an insolvency representative
(trustee in bankruptcy in the U.S. system). The same need exists if a
person’s receivables are sold, either to a factor or as part of a securitization
program. The buyer must be protected from the same cast of
characters.133
130. Stewart, supra note 8, at 229.
131. U.N. Convention on the Assignment of Receivables in International Trade, Dec. 12, 2001,
S. TREATY DOC. NO. 114-7.
132. U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Apr. 11, 1980, S.
TREATY DOC. NO. 98-9, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3.
133. As used in this Article, “receivables” means contractual rights to the payment of money,
and “assignment” includes both the creation of a security right in receivables as collateral for an
obligation and the outright sale of receivables. “Assignor” means both a person that grants an interest
in receivables as collateral for value received (e.g., a loan) and a person that sells receivables; and
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Many countries have sophisticated laws governing a lender’s or
buyer’s priority rights. In the United States that law is Article 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”), which is a joint product of the ULC
and the American Law Institute (“ALI”). In Canada, it is the Personal
Property Security Act (“PPSA”). The UCC and the PPSA are State and
provincial, rather than federal, law, and an assignee must have certainty as
to which State’s or province’s law governs priority rights. Under both
regimes, this certainty is provided by choice-of-law rules designating the
law of the assignor’s location as the governing law. The choice-of-law
rules work well for a domestic transaction, but there is a risk in an
international transaction that a court will choose the law of a country that
does not have a robust set of rules protecting the interests of assignees.
The purpose of the Convention on the Assignment of Receivables in
International Trade is to provide certainty with regard to the governing
law in international transactions. It was drafted by the U.N. Commission
on International Trade Law and approved by the U.N. General Assembly
on December 12, 2001. The Convention has been adopted by Liberia and
signed by Luxembourg, Madagascar, and the U.S. (on December 30,
2003). It must be adopted by five nations to enter into force. The U.S.
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations held hearings on the treaty in
March 2018 and recommended it favorably for advice and consent to the
full Senate on September 12, 2018. The Senate gave its advice and consent
on January 2, 2019. The United States deposited the instrument of
ratification on October 15, 2019.
The Convention excludes from its scope transactions in securities,
derivatives and other financial assets, assignments of deposit accounts,
and assignments of claims under letters of credit and independent
guaranties.
It has rules protecting the holders of negotiable instruments and
assignees of certain real estate lease receivables. Because of these
restrictions, the Convention primarily applies to assignments of trade,
loan, and similar commercial and consumer receivables arising in assetbased lending, factoring, securitization, and project finance transactions.
The Convention applies only if the assignment or the receivable is
“international,” meaning that the assignor and assignee are in different
countries (international assignment) or the assignor and the debtor are in
different countries (international receivable). Also, in all cases the assignor
must be in a country that has adopted the Convention. For the debtor’s
rights and obligations to be affected, the debtor must be located in a
“assignee” means a person that acquires an interest in receivables as collateral for an obligation and
a buyer of receivables. The person that owes payment to the assignor is called the “debtor.”
“Convention” means the United Nations Convention on the Assignment of Receivables in
International Trade.
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country that has adopted the Convention or the contract giving rise to the
receivable must be governed by the law of a country that has adopted it.
The Convention was drafted at a time when UCC Article 9 was
undergoing wholesale revisions, and the State Department appointed to
its delegation individuals who were involved in the Article 9 revision
process. Issues raised in negotiating the Convention were considered by
the Article 9 drafting committee, and issues raised in the Article 9 process
were considered in negotiating the Convention. This had the salutary
effect of creating significant harmony between the Convention and
domestic U.S. law. The main differences between the Convention and
Article 9 relate to a small subset of the rules that determine which
jurisdiction’s law governs an assignee’s rights in a receivable.
A study to determine whether ratification of the Convention would
be too disruptive of domestic law was undertaken by a committee jointly
approved by the ULC and ALI, and it was joined by representatives of
the Uniform Law Conference of Canada and the Uniform Law Center of
Mexico. There was some consideration of simply harmonizing the laws of
the three countries with respect to the assignment of receivables, but
eventually it was determined that each country should become a party to
the Convention. Consideration was given to amending Article 9 to reflect
the Convention’s choice-of-law rules for international assignments and
provisions to that effect were drafted, but the idea was abandoned
because of concern that gaining enactment in the more than fifty U.S.
jurisdictions would be difficult and time-consuming and therefore might
be disruptive of ongoing commercial transactions.
After making the tentative decision to recommend ratification to the
Senate, the committee tested the market for the Convention by holding
open symposia, jointly sponsored by the State Department’s Office of
Private International Law, in New York and Los Angeles at which the
rules of the Convention were explained in the context of specific
hypotheticals. In addition to representatives of a number of major law
firms, the symposia were attended by representatives of major financial
institutions such as Bank of America, Citicorp, GMAC, JPMorgan Chase,
Merrill Lynch, PNC Bank, UBS, Wachovia, US Bank, and Standard and
Poor’s. The overwhelming reaction was that the choice-of-law differences
were manageable and that ratification was in the best interests of the
United States.134
The committee ultimately prepared a draft of a potential report from
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to the full Senate recommending
134. See NAT’L CONF. COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM ST. LAWS, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE
TO HARMONIZE NORTH AMERICAN LAW WITH REGARD TO THE ASSIGNMENT OF RECEIVABLES
IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE CONVENTION 5-6 (2007).
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ratification subject to certain declarations and understandings designed to
minimize the differences between the Convention and Article 9.135 These
declarations and understandings were crucial for the Convention to
function in harmony with domestic U.S. law, and they were the most
important part of the committee’s work. The committee also prepared a
draft report containing an article-by-article comparison of the Convention
and Article 9 for potential submission by the State Department to the
President. It was understood by all concerned that the Convention would
be self-executing.
Although this meant no new State implementing legislation because
existing law was adequate, the effect of the Convention on State law
played a significant role in the drafting of the Convention and in the
ultimate decision to recommend ratification to the U.S. Senate. Without
the work of the joint ULC-ALI committee, it is not clear that the
Convention could have moved forward towards ratification. This is
perhaps the best available model for future State-federal cooperation.
A. Convention on the International Sale of Goods
The 1980 U.N. Convention on the International Sale of Goods
(“CISG”) serves an important function in trans-border trade by providing
a uniform, internationally agreed-upon regime for ordinary commercial
transactions. Specifically, it addresses the legal rules governing the
formation of contracts for the international sale of goods, the respective
obligations of the buyer and seller, the passage of risk, and remedies
available to both parties in case of breach of contract. It applies to sales
contracts between private parties whose places of business are in different
states party to the treaty. The aim is to promote certainty in cross-border
business-to-business dealings by displacing differing (and often
conflicting) domestic rules that might otherwise be applicable to the
parties and their contract. Some consider it one of the international
community's most ambitious and successful efforts to promote efficiency
and sustained growth of international trade.136
The United States ratified the CISG in 1986 and it became effective
domestically on January 1, 1988. Even though the treaty had broad
support in the U.S. business community, its ratification proved
controversial for several reasons, among them: (i) U.S. law governing

135. S. EXEC. REP. NO. 115-7 (2018).
136. As of the time of this writing the CISG has been adopted by 93 countries. Status: United
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, UNCITRAL,
https://uncitral.un.org/en/texts/salegoods/conventions/sale_of_goods/cisg/status (last visited
Jan. 1, 2020).
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contractual relationships in the United States is almost entirely State
(rather than federal) law, even though a measure of uniformity has been
achieved through State adoption of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial
Code; (ii) the CISG’s provisions are often inconsistent with the relevant
provisions of Article 2, and (iii) there was considerable reluctance to
permit the federal government to intrude into the traditional role of States
in the field of ordinary commercial transactions by “federalizing”
commercial law.
Rather than implementing the treaty through federal legislation, the
choice was made to adopt it on a self-executing basis, so that (by virtue
of the Supremacy Clause), to the extent it applies in a given commercial
context, it does so directly and overrides inconsistent State law, including
UCC Article 2, unless the contracting parties explicitly opt out. By
definition, enforcement of the CISG would fall primarily to the judiciary
since the treaty would typically come into play when the parties could not
resolve a dispute and had submitted it to litigation. All U.S. courts –
federal and State – would therefore be bound to apply the CISG to issues
raised by international sales contracts covered by the treaty. Since the
treaty would apply only in cases of disputes under international
transactions, federal regulation of which falls within Congress’s authority
under the Commerce Clause, the intrusion into a traditional area of State
authority was relatively mild.
The impact of the CISG has indeed been somewhat limited. One
reason is that contracting parties (and not infrequently the courts
considering their dispute) are often unaware that the treaty applies to the
particular transaction.137 As a self-executing treaty, the CISG became
federal law directly, without being “codified.” As a result, lawyers and
judges often overlook it in their research and are inclined to default,
mistakenly, to the relevant State law in their analyses. Moreover, even
when they are aware that the CISG applies, they frequently struggle with
the different terminology used in the treaty and the comparative lack of
interpretive precedent in prior case law, turning in such cases to otherwise
applicable State law (with which they are more familiar). This
phenomenon, which is unfortunate but perhaps inevitable, is sometimes
described as the “homeward trend.”138

137. One of the motivations in enacting the Uniform International Wills Act was to make the
provisions of the Washington Convention on Wills visible to state judges and practitioners who
would normally only consult compilations of state law rather than federal law or international law. See
UNIF. L. COMM’N, UNIFORM WILLS RECOGNITION ACT 4 (2009).
138. Harry Flechtner, Article 79 of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale
of Goods (CISG) as Rorschach Test: The Homeward Trend and Exemption for Delivering Non-Conforming Goods,
19 PACE INT'L L. REV. 29 (2007).
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One recent empirical study indicates that experienced U.S. attorneys
often advise their clients to opt out of the CISG, which the Convention
permits. John Coyle’s dataset indicates that “past surveys of U.S. lawyers
dramatically overstate the extent to which the CISG has gained
acceptance within the U.S. legal community”139 and “highlight the
potential unfairness of requiring unsophisticated U.S. companies to
litigate international contract disputes under a set of treaty rules that are
routinely avoided by their more sophisticated brethren.”140
The CISG experience demonstrates both the difficulties that can arise
when the subject-matter of a treaty is primarily State (rather than federal)
law and the often-overlooked shortcomings of the “self-execution”
approach to treaty implementation. It also suggests that leaving treaty
implementation entirely to the courts (often touted as an optimal “control
mechanism”) has some drawbacks when it comes to ensuring consistency
of interpretation and application.
A. Self-Executing Treaties and Their Limitations
At least in the abstract, it would seem that making a treaty selfexecuting would be far better than depending on separate legislative
enactments by fifty States plus the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico,
Guam, and the Virgin Islands. Nevertheless, empirically, there are a
number of caveats or limitations to this.
First, the idea of a purely self-executing agreement might be illusory.
As Stewart notes, most treaties that are described as self- executing are
not and in fact are legislatively implemented.141 With the rise of
multilateral treaties has come greater complexity, not only because they
need to be broadly applicable to many parties, but also because the
subjects of treaties are now more intricate and multifaceted. Additional
implementing legislation at the national and/or State level becomes
essential.
Second, the process of self-execution may work better when the
primary responsibility for execution and compliance lies at the federal,
rather than State, level although this was not the outcome with respect to
CISG. There is also less likely to be political pushback at the State level if
the subject of the treaty is not highly salient there. Thus, choosing the selfexecuting option may be best when such implementation occurs more at
the federal than the subnational level.

139. John F. Coyle, The Role of the CISG in U.S. Contract Practice: An Empirical Study, 38 U. PA. J.
INT’L L. 195, 196 (2016).
140. Id.
141. Stewart, supra note 8, at 232, 271.
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Third, and as the CISG example indicates, there is no guarantee that
self-executing agreements will have their intended effect at the State level.
In some areas, it appears that treaty law is not applied, not because of
opposition but because of ignorance on the part of State lawyers and
judges. Even generally, Stewart notes that the empirical evidence that selfexecution increases compliance with international obligations is lacking.142
Finally, implementing treaties directly through self-execution rather
than legislation does not necessarily speed up the process of getting the
law onto the books. The Receivables Convention was negotiated in 2001
and, seventeen years later, has not been ratified by the United States, much
less entered into force even with an unusually low five-party threshold for
that entry.

VII. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
Countries want the treaties they negotiate to be effective in order to
reap the benefits associated with them. But successfully negotiating a
treaty and effectively implementing its provisions are different
undertakings, even if ratification is assured. Some agreements require
additional implementing legislation at the national and subnational level
to give them the desired legal effect within those jurisdictions. This is part
of a broader concern facing international law: rules may be adopted, but
the legal operating system or infrastructure cannot ensure that they take
effect. Subnational implementation may fill in some operational gaps, but
this assumes that countries can and will follow through with appropriate
legislative actions. For a number of reasons discussed above, this does not
always occur.
The problem is more acute for a complex federal system like that of
the United States where the treaty-making power clearly resides with the
federal government, but where implementation requires either a political
decision to pre-empt State law or separate legislative action by the
constituent States. Over the decades, as multilateral treaty-making has
moved increasingly into subjects covered by State law, the federal
government has actively reached out to include representatives and
experts representing State interests on treaty negotiating delegations.
Regular consultation has also been instituted through bodies like the
U.S. Department of State’s Advisory Committee on Private International
Law consisting of members from private organizations, including bar
associations, and representatives of federal and State agencies and courts.
The Advisory Committee also organizes study groups to provide advice

142. Id. at 280.
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on specialized subjects of private international law.143 Organizations
active on the Advisory Committee are the American Branch of the
International Law Association, the American Law Institute, the American
Society of International Law, the Section of International Law of the
American Bar Association, and the ULC.144 Of this list, only the ULC has
a primary focus on State interests.
As we have seen, failure to pass implementing legislation has a
number of consequences. First, if the prospects of subnational
implementation are dubious or likely to be incomplete (e.g., if a large
number of U.S. States are unlikely to adopt the necessary legislation), the
federal government might be reluctant to negotiate or sign a given
agreement even if there are benefits for the country; there are reputational
costs in accepting an agreement if it cannot guarantee implementation
(and even in negotiating actively but then failing to adhere to a treaty).
Similarly, foreign governments are likely to be reluctant to be a party with
the United States if there is no credible commitment that subnational
implementation will occur.
A second scenario is that the United States signs an agreement but is
unable to ratify it because of an inability to secure implementing
legislation. This would result in no benefits from the agreement since
other treaty parties would not be obligated vis-à-vis the United States to
follow the agreement provisions.
Third, and a variation of the previous situation, the United States
might ratify the treaty, but still be unable to ensure State-level adoption.
As has been true in several cases noted above, the U.S. government could
be held responsible in international courts for performance failure or
breach of its international obligations even if the federal government
cannot compel State governments to cooperate. This issue arises in other
countries with federal systems, but is more pronounced for the United
States because the number of subnational entities makes adherence
through normal State legislative processes very difficult.
How might states avoid the deleterious consequences above when
subnational implementation of treaties fails? This study examined practice
in the United States on subnational implementation of treaties, describing
the process and examining one case of success and one of failure. Clearly,
the ULC is a major asset for the United States as it provides a familiar,
respected, and used mechanism for advising and drafting legislation that
143. For information about the Advisory Committee on Private International Law, see Advisory
committee on Private International Law, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, https://www.state.gov/advisorycommittee-on-private-international-law/ (last visited Jan. 1, 2020).
144. See Committee Members, Meetings, and Advisory Reports, GENERAL SERVICES ADMIN.,
https://www.facadatabase.gov/FACA/FACAPublicViewCommitteeDetails?id=a10t0000001gzpO
AAQ (last visited Jan. 1, 2020).
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can then be adopted by fifty States if they so choose. This was the case
with the 2008 UIFSA that included the provisions of The Hague
Convention on the International Recovery of Child Support and Other
Forms of Family Maintenance.
It is hard to imagine any chance of coordinated legislative action at
the State level without such a body. Even so, as we saw with the 1973
Convention Providing a Uniform Law on the Form of an International
Will (the Washington Convention) success is far from assured with
respect to international agreements although the ULC produced a
Uniform Law on the Form of an International Will that was annexed to
the Convention.145 The ULC has a record of success that includes more
than three hundred instances of uniform law adoption, but these deal
almost exclusively with purely internal or domestic concerns and not
international treaties. At the same time, international efforts to regulate or
to harmonize activities are increasing in areas of domestic and State law
within the United States. These include “matters relating to children and
families; dispute resolution (including international arbitration and
mediation); judicial cooperation (including the recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments); insolvency; finance and banking;
secured transactions; contract law; electronic commerce; and wills, trusts,
and estates.”146
How might the prospects for subnational implementation of treaties
be improved? This study reviewed the option of self-executing treaties,
which would obviate the need for subnational implementation.
Nevertheless, we have seen the limitations to this approach, not the least
of which were Constitutional restrictions and the possibility that State
legal officials would unwittingly ignore relevant treaty obligations as
appears to have occurred in the case of enforcing the provisions of the
Convention on the International Sale of Goods. This leads us to circle
back to see what we might conclude from the ULC driven process of
consultation and drafting.
Drawing conclusions from a single case of success is risky, but we can
also learn from the failures that have occurred. Generally, subnational
implementation is most likely when the following conditions are met:
• Where State laws already largely conform to what a
treaty provides; that is, where existing subnational law is
adequate to meet the treaty’s requirements. This exists in
some areas based on past ULC successes within a purely
145. From the time the Uniform Wills Act was promulgated in 1977 to 2019, only 20
jurisdictions enacted it (18 States, the District of Columbia, and the U.S. Virgin Islands). See supra
note 137.
146. Stewart, supra note 8, at 280; supra note 138.
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domestic context, and thus any necessary adjustments
based on the treaty should be more manageable. If such
laws are already in place, one might question the need for
additional action at the State level, specifically to
implement a treaty, but such implementation ensures that
the same processes operate for U.S. citizens and
companies in other countries under an international
agreement.
• Early involvement of the ULC and other domestic
stakeholders in the treaty negotiation process. This
occurs in some cases, but not all. Such involvement could
allow U.S. negotiators to craft treaty provisions and
adjust bargaining positions that most closely correspond
to State law or which have the best prospects for later
adoption by States, while still having the treaty serve U.S.
interests. It is important in most cases for the United
States government to involve domestic constituencies
during the negotiations, in order to get a full
understanding of the problem to be solved, how it’s
handled in domestic law and practice, and what the legal
and political limits might be. Still, there is never a
guarantee that the United States can get all it wants or
needs during a treaty negotiation. In an international
community of 194 independent states, with varying legal
systems, unanimity is rarely achievable and compromise
is almost always necessary, requiring some adjustment on
the part of the constituent States of the United States.
• Delay ratification until after subnational legislative
adoption has taken place. This approach ensures that
domestic implementation is effective and that the United
States doesn’t make commitments internationally that are
not reflected in individual State practice, which can take
a long time to reach completion. In the meantime, U.S.
interests are not served by the treaty as has been the case,
for example of the Wills Convention.
The structure of the U.S. federal system poses challenges with respect
to ratification and implementation of treaties, but is the United States
doomed to suboptimality, i.e. signing treaties that it does not ratify? Is it
so bad that only some U.S. States adopt uniform acts in support of treaties
(i.e., is there a significant risk that lack of uniform implementation would
pose a substantial likelihood that the United States would be found in
violation of its treaty obligations)? Alternatively, is it so bad that the
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United States cannot become party to many agreements because it cannot
figure out how to assure effective domestic implementation?
Because not all States had adopted the necessary laws, the more
common outcome with efforts to use uniform acts to implement treaty
obligations is enactment in some number of States but the United States
not ratifying the agreement. Julian Ku provides the following list of
examples:
[T]he Uniform Probate Code, adopted in eighteen [U.S.]
states, also contains provisions “in harmony with” the
Hague Convention on the Conflicts of Laws Relating to the
Form of Testamentary Dispositions. The Uniform Trust
Code, adopted in nineteen states, has a provision allowing
a settlor to designate the governing law, and in the absence
of such designation, providing choice of law rules is
“consistent with and was partially patterned on the Hague
Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on their
Recognition.” And the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction
and Enforcement Act, adopted in forty-six states, provides
that a custody determination can be registered without any
request for enforcement. As the official comment to this
section notes, this provision is required by the Hague
Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition
and Cooperation in Respect of Parental Responsibility and
Measures of the Protection of Children.147
Because the primary objective of many of these private international
law conventions is to harmonize and to coordinate important practices
around the world, a question can be raised as to the value of efforts, such
as the drafting of uniform acts, to harmonize various legal regimes and to
minimize differences. Is the effort of producing a study and uniform or
model act that might be adopted only by some jurisdictions still valuable
as a step towards helping to conform U.S. and international practices?
After all, the time it takes to negotiate a treaty and to adopt subsequent
implementing legislation might change the political circumstances that
initially compelled a project to completion. As we have seen with the Wills
Convention, failure to achieve greater enactment may not stem from
opposition. It simply may no longer be a high enough priority to carry the
project over the finish line towards levels of enactment that would result
in the U.S. completing the treaty ratification process. This also suggests
147. Julian G. Ku, The Crucial Role of the States and Private International Law Treaties: A Model for
Accommodating Globalization, 73 MO. L. REV. 1063, 1067-68 (2008).
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that the United States government may want to ensure that the relevant
domestic constituencies actually believe a treaty is needed before engaging
in the treaty- making process and that States will subsequently enact the
necessary legislation to make eventual ratification of an international
agreement by the United States possible.
Does the close cooperation between those negotiating the treaties and
those who have to implement them at the State level help to harmonize
practice even if formal acts are not adopted and treaties not ratified? As
noted above, the adoption of international standards is not confined to
States; municipalities have also adopted measures to implement treaty
provisions. As Boss suggests: “These may be considered illustrations of
domestic attempts at international harmonization of the law rather than
state implementation of international treaty obligations.”148
Such piecemeal adoption of international treaty obligations
complicates the international legal landscape but seems unavoidable given
the political structures in place and the kinds of subject matter now
subject to international regulation. Although such an approach might
make the advantages and conveniences of these treaties available to
individuals in the jurisdictions that accept these provisions, it still places
U.S. nationals and interests at a disadvantage outside the United States
where such piecemeal adoption may not be recognized.
The interests of constituent States of the United States will necessarily
be involved in treaty implementation because of the nature of the issues
now subject to international regulation. In order to maintain their
prerogatives and protect their citizens and interests, States can act through
processes they control and influence or be subject to federal legislation
should their failure to do so damage U.S. interests. We have seen where
and how cooperation between the federal and State governments can take
place. Only time will tell if these experiences and networks will lead to
increased levels of cooperation and higher levels of U.S. participation in
multilateral treaties. This Article shows how and where cooperation has
occurred and how such cooperation might provide an additional pathway
towards treaty implementation in the United States.

148. Boss, supra note 127, at 384 n.152.

